Ferrel monk parakeets in Brooklyn (They've been living there long enough to get into some bird identification guides) are being poached by .... parakeet poachers! Here is the story.
Check this out:
Exelon, a nuclear giant that recently backed away from building new nuclear plants, is moving into wind.
The inside story on giant sharks at Tetrapod Zoology.
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TerraPass to provide carbon balanced shipping to jasmere.com.
by TerraPass
Online shopping is a great option for making quick, easy purchases that are shipped right to your door. However, shipping your items across the country can carry a heavy burden on the environment (yes, pun intended).
Which is why we are thrilled to announce a new carbon balanced shipping partnership with jasmere.com, an online site that features a “daily offer” from specialty retailers. What’s unique about jasmere is that as more customers buy the featured product of the day, the less everyone has to pay (if you’re not a believer, you can read more here). Some recent features have included organic clothing, eco-friendly flip flops, and TerraPass offsets.
Each of jasmere’s vendors now has the option to join “Ships Green” and balance out the emissions from their shipments. For each unit bought, the featured merchant will be supporting TerraPass projects, without passing on any additional cost to their customers. The feedback has been great so far, with dozens of new retailers jumping on board and lots of customer excitement around this initiative.
So keep your eye out for the Ships Green logo on jasmere, and get in touch with us if your company (or friend, family member, neighbor) would be interested in carbon balanced shipping.
As the nation's largest youth development organization - with a network of more than 6 million young people - 4-H prepares youth to move our world forward. Through out-of-school programming, in-school enrichment programs and camps, 4-H cultivates the next generation of leaders, strengthening our nation's ability to tackle leading challenges such as global competitiveness, world hunger, civic involvement, and becoming a healthier society.
One Million New Scientists, One Million New Ideas
4-H is working to address our nation's critical scientific workforce challenges by preparing one million new young people to excel in the areas of science, engineering, and technology by the year 2013. To aid in this effort, 4-H National Youth Science Day was created to spark an early youth interest in science. On Wednesday, October 6, 2010, the third annual 4-H National Youth Science Day, will bring together hundreds of thousands of youth around the nation to complete a single science experiment. This year, the National Science Experiment, 4-H2O, focuses on water quality and climate change - two critical issues facing our global community today.
In addition, 4-H Robotics programming provides young people with the opportunity to explore robotics in a hands-on way while gaining exposure to the educational and career prospects of the field of engineering. The fundamental 4-H ideal of practical, learning-by-doing encourages young people to experiment, innovate, and think independently. Today, more than 400,000 4-H youth are actively engaged in robotics and engineering programs and this number is expected to grow in tandem with the new 4-H Robotics curriculum that will be released nationwide later this year.
Creating the Next Generation of Leaders in Every Country in the Nation
As the youth development program of Cooperative Extension and USDA, 4-H is directly connected to the research and resources of 109 land-grant universities and colleges and more than 3,000 local county Extension offices across the nation. This connection strategically positions 4-H to help grow the next generation of science leaders and strengthen the nation's ability to tackle the world's top challenges such as energy independence, healthcare and the environment. 4-H programs are further supported by 514,000 dedicated adult volunteers around the nation who help to put 4-H youth on a path towards successful careers.
4-H programs engage and excite young people in today's high-demand industries. Whether youth are expanding upon 4-H's tradition of agricultural science through learning about genetic engineering, agro-robotics, and sustainable agriculture or diving into some of the newest programs in the areas of wind energy, rocketry or computer science, there is always something rewarding and exciting for every child.
To learn more about how you can participate in 4-H Science initiatives, including 4-H National Youth Science Day on October 6th, visit us at www.4-H.org/NYSD
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Episode 2 of series 2 of Inside Nature's Giants was devoted to pythons (for an article reviewing ep 1, go here). Specifically, to Burmese pythons Python molurus. And, quite right too. Snakes are among the weirdest and most phenomenally modified of tetrapods: in contrast to we boring tetrapodal tetrapods with our big limb girdles, long limbs and less than 100 vertebrae, we're talking about tubular reptiles with a few hundred vertebrae, stretched organs, distensible jaws and total or virtual absence of limbs and limb girdles [montage above shows Simon Watt with captive Burmese python (© Windfall Films), a CG proto-snake (© Windfall Films/Channel 4) and an alligator and a python in combat (photo Lori Oberhofer)].
WARNING: major spoiler ahead - last warning!
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Public Citizen, the American Medical Student Association (AMSA) and other worker advocates petitioned the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to issue a regulation limiting the number of hours worked by medical residents. The petitioners argue that the excessive hours expected by the employers (hospitals) of these physicians-in-training cause chronic sleep deprivation and stress, which contributes to motor vehicle crashes, depression and mood disorders, needlestick injuries and other health problems. Among the compelling evidence provided are studies demonstrating significantly diminished mental acuity for sleep-deprived medical residents at levels comparable to 0.05% blood alcohol levels. One cited study indicated:
"Reaction times were 7% slower (p<.001), commission of errors was 40% higher (p< 0.001), speed variability was 71% greater (p<0.001) in heavy-call residents compared to light-call resident physicians."*The petitioners use anecdotes to illustrate how a working condition---in this case excessive hours on-the-job---has a latent effect on the worker once they've left the workplace.
"Almost every resident I know in that program [surgery] has fallen asleep at the wheel driving home from work. And many of them have been in car accidents."
Were injuries sustained in these car accident work-related? I would say so. I doubt though that many employers (including the administrators of these hospitals) label them work-related. [Current OSHA regulations also exempt them.**]
As Sid Wolfe, MD of Public Citizen's Health Research Group notes:
"The dangerously excessive number of hours resident physicians are currently allowed to work is a similarly toxic exposure that OSHA has the authority to regulate and reduce in order to protect these physicians from harm."Read the rest of this post... | Read the comments on this post...
It am all de rage, as they say. But is it any good? And who are the IAC anyway? Go on, hands up, before they were asked to do this: had anyone heard of them? Thought not: I certainly hadn't. This is an organisation so well-known that the wikipedia article on [[IAC]] (note: that is today's version; I assume that someone will add it, eventually) doesn't even include them, although it has space for 15 or so other IAC's. Although Gavin seems to quite like the report, I'm less sure. So before getting down to reading the report, here is another piece of meta-analysis: if you read the exec summary it notes that the first IAC report was Inventing a Better Future - A Strategy for Building Worldwide Capacities in Science and Technology. You've heard of it? Unlikely - google news shows no hits and all the google hits seem to be to the usual people you'd expect to note it and ignore it. I note that All IAC draft reports undergo an intensive process of peer-review by other international experts though unlike the IPCC it isn't an open review process - we can't see the reviewers comments, let alone see the various drafts (and it does need review: there is an error on p iii of the exec summary, where they fail to capitalise Winnacker's surname. Trivial, obviously).
A bit more preamble, in the spirit of declaring COI: when I was in science, I was very peripherally involved in the IPCC, as was everyone; but I never rose to the dizzy ranks of contributing author or even close; I just talked to a few people who were writing stuff.
Anyway, I can no longer put off actually reading the thing... but then I realised I couldn't be bothered. So I just read the exec summary. This means you should discount what I say by some appropriate amount.
But before I go on, I should quote the preamble, which is there to be ignored (most of the news reports on the IAC report did, of course):
Since its founding more than 20 years ago, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) can claim many important accomplishments to its credit. First among these are the periodic assessments of our understanding of the nature, origin, and impact of observed changes in the world's climate. Also among its significant contributions has been the sustaining of a global focus on climate change. Indeed IPCC has provided the framework for a continued and rather remarkable international conversation on climate research both among scientists and policymakers. In many ways IPCC, with its massive, far-flung, and decentralized network of scientists along with the governments represented on the Panel, represents a significant social innovation. For these and other contributions the IPCC was one of the recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007.
Or, put another way: "the IPCC has been a great success. But faced with some worthless criticism we'll ignore all that and produce some headless-chicken recommendations."
Below the fold is the 3rd in a series of follow up posts providing analysis on the difficulties of maintaining our current energy paradigm with renewable energy (generally, 'the fake fire brigade'). The main authors are Hannes Kunz, President of Institute for Integrated Economic Research (IIER) and Stephen Balogh, a PhD student at SUNY-ESF and Senior Research Associate at IIER. IIER is a non-profit organization that integrates research from the financial/economic system, energy and natural resources, and human behavior with an objective of developing/initiating strategies that result in more benign trajectories after global growth ends. The authors have written an extensive follow-up to the questions raised in the original posting and I've broken into 5 pieces for readability - the 3nd installment, with a focus on electricity generation in an energy transition, is below the fold. This installment has been delayed a few weeks due to Hannes taking time off to get married....
In this third installment in this series, we want to put some emphasis on one of the most important enablers of human civilization of the 20th century: electricity. Its ubiquitous availability from every power plug is something we take for granted, despite the fact that stable electricity production is probably one of the most complex continuous endeavors of mankind, and one where many poorer countries fail.
In this post we would like to provide an overview of some of the properties of electricity, describe its nature (as a flow based system), and explain what challenges it faces in the future – especially those related to maintaining current delivery patterns once we have to increasingly rely on inputs no longer coming from fossil fuels that can be stored and burned mostly at our discretion, but from increasingly stochastic, largely uncorrelated flows such as solar or wind.
Electricity is a core topic of IIER’s research, because for us, maintaining anything that more or less resembles our current advanced economies is synonymous with uninterrupted, reliable electricity which mostly comes as a discretionary service to the user. Users, in this case, aren’t just private consumers, but also industrial and commercial applications, which are part of any advanced society.
Electric power is also the area of greatest debate, greatest hope and greatest investment, and the area where IIER thinks that societies face challenges with all their current attempts. Presently, OECD countries are targeting electricity generation as a means to meet carbon emission reduction goals, while simultaneously encouraging the development of non-fossil fuel based transportation (e.g. electric vehicles) and other moves away from coal and oil in industrial applications. They do this – so we think – without a robust plan as to how to maintain today’s delivery security. All plans aim at combining wind, solar, geothermal, and nuclear, super- and smart grids into one new robust delivery system, and there seems to be general agreement that this will actually work. But after thorough and unbiased research of the characteristics of electricity delivery systems, the parameters of those new technologies and the discrepancies between assumptions and reality, we are now skeptical as to whether societies will be able to provide stable electricity at acceptable prices going forward. We realize that this statement is almost considered a sacrilege.
Below, we will try to explain our concerns step by step, and why we fear that investing hundreds of billions in an electricity system that is far more complex and far less reliable will lead us in the wrong direction, given the details of our current situation. Once again, a clarification: we are not arguing the fact that we slowly have to move away from fossil fuels and start using more renewable sources to provide our energy needs. However, we disagree with the common notion that societies can make this renewable energy transition and still receive the same services as today: stable and affordable electricity not just for private consumption, but for all uses that are part of an advanced industrialized society.
In our first post, we introduced IIER’s Electricity Availability Index. It measures the availability of electricity in a country based on penetration (% of population with electricity) and reliability (outages and duration of outages per average customer).
Some commenters questioned the relationship between electricity and wealth (measured in purchasing-power adjusted GDP per capita). Such was the first hypothesis we tested when developing the EAI metric. The chicken-and-egg question can - as we think - be resolved quite easily, by testing in which directions we find the outliers. In case the assumption of “wealth is possible without stable electricity” is correct, there should be countries with low electricity availability that still are quite rich (measured in GDP per capita). However, these do not exist, the “richest” outlier is resource-rich Botswana (diamonds, copper, nickel) with close to $14’000 per capita and an EAI of only 21.9%. On the other hand, we do find rather poor countries with almost 90% electricity availability (such as The Philippines and Mongolia, with a per capita GDP of around $3’500), which leads to the conclusion that the correlation is unidirectional, or in other words: You don't have to be rich to have stable electricity, but your country needs stable electricity to become (or stay) rich.
There are two discrete aspects of electricity’s importance to society: the benefit of its ubiquitous on-demand availability, and the severe side-effects of power interruptions. Let’s look at a simple illustration. Few companies in OECD countries install backup power for desktop computers, despite the risk of data loss during a power outage. The reason is economic – outages are so rare that the possible the cost for buying, maintaining and operating the backup equipment outweighs the risk of outage, which is why only servers and data centers are deemed worthy investments into power backup solutions. In emerging or developing countries, backup systems are commonplace, but only if businesses can afford them. But most local businesses cannot, which makes it primarily an option for international corporations, while local companies are at a disadvantage.
Other applications, particularly of industrial nature, can’t even operate with backups; they simply need a power guarantee. The pots of an aluminum smelter require uninterrupted power 24/7, 365 days a year. If the power is lost for more than a few hours, not only does the process stop, but after a short while the aluminum begins to congeal, with the consequence that the entire pot has to be scrapped, incurring costs of millions of dollars. Or think of a shopping mall that suddenly goes dark. No lights except for emergency lighting, no access to transaction services to process a credit or debit card, no elevators or escalators, and ultimately no sales. There are multiple studies on the cost of “reliability events” in power grids, each reporting very significant losses (a lot of research has been done at Berkeley Lab, documents can be found at: http://certs.lbl.gov/CERTS_P_Reliability.html). So while – as many people correctly say - power outages are just a nuisance to private households as long as they don’t exceed the time a fridge or freezer can hold its temperature, they are a threat to all more complex industrial and commercial activities that make our societies “advanced” and require the humming of electricity-driven machinery almost around the clock.
This now ties back to the Electricity Availability Index – many things are either impossible or economically not feasible in environments where grid stability becomes an issue. And even for applications where it is theoretically possible to ramp them up and down without efficiency or material losses based on energy availability, there are significant social costs associated with unpredictability. If there is no power, should we send all the workers home for a week, and call them again at 1am on the Sunday when supply comes back? We can certainly do this, but in reality we would probably rather cease many of those activities, because the opportunity cost of underutilized equipment and labor becomes so big that the final objective no longer makes economic sense.
There are two ways that electricity is supplied. In smaller, poorer, or more remote areas, electrical production is achieved by a standalone solution that provides comfort or capabilities to those able to afford it. Often this is provided by diesel generators which can produce electricity as required, or by standalone hydro, coal or natural gas power plants which serve a local area or industrial activity. Increasingly, solar panels combined with batteries provide this service, or wind turbines in conjunction with oil based generators. The key characteristic of this type of delivery system usually is very high cost per delivered kWh.
In richer economies or even in urban areas almost all around the world, electricity is delivered via a centrally managed grid, which balances inputs and outputs effectively to ensure that demand is always met. In poorer countries, this often does not work out, with the consequence of regular grid breakdowns. In OECD countries, however, we are so used to the grid’s reliability that even small power outages regularly make the news headlines. Below, we will mostly focus on grid based systems, as only those are capable of delivering the basic industrial and commercial services for societies we are used to receiving.
What we get from our power sockets as “electricity” is the product of an electric current that is converted into useful work by an appliance. To make sure that those appliances work, particularly more fragile ones involving electronics, voltage and frequency must be standardized across entire regions (for example 120V/60Hz in Northern America or 230V/50Hz in Europe).
An electricity delivery system can be compared to a complex set of water pipes where water (electricity) enters at multiple points and is withdrawn at hundreds of thousands of faucets. Contrary to a water delivery systems, these electrical ‘pipes and faucets’ are so fragile that they almost immediately burst or collapse when too much or too little water is in the system. Or in other words – electricity is a fully flow based system, where inputs and outputs have to be matched at any point in time with deviations of less than 0.5% between supply and demand (see ENTSO-E manuals for more detail: https://www.entsoe.eu/index.php?id=57, particularly the one on “Emergency Procedures”) .
Currently, this system is fully supply-controlled (i.e. production is following expected and actual demand), which is why it has become so beneficial to society. It delivers seemingly unlimited and unrestricted amounts of energy to each room in our homes, offices and factories, and except for heavy loads in an industry or computing (server farms), there is no user-level planning required before flipping a switch, plugging in a heater, turning on a computer. Electricity just flows according to one’s needs. Later, we will examine demand side flexibility, but first, we want to focus on the supply side, which is where electricity systems are controlled today.
To meet demand, which follows the cycles of human ecosystem patterns (days, nights, work/non-work days, heat, cold) is today matched by a combination of power sources that together form a highly flexible supply system, which also includes reserves to match unexpected demand spikes or sudden supply-side failures, for example when a power plant experiences an emergency shutdown. We will dive into the different load patterns and reserve provisions a little further down, but the key characteristic of a vast majority of inputs today is that they are fully predictable and mostly controllable. This is because inputs come from steady flows (like a running river), but by a large majority from stock based resources that can be consumed whenever there is a need, such as coal, natural gas, stored water or nuclear power (the latter could, for reasons to be discussed further down, also be seen as a steady flow). So in essence, what we have built is a highly complex system that converts steady flows and stocks into a well-managed, demand driven flow of electric current.
What most OECD countries plan to do is to replace some of those steady flows or stocks on the supply side by adding more and more renewables with erratic flows. Currently, those stochastic, non-controllable flows from solar and wind power account for a maximum of 5% of total power production in each interconnected grid systems we are aware of [see Table 1 for the U.S. (combining Western and Eastern interconnection for lack of data) and for the European interconnected grid system – ENTSO-E], but by 2030, most countries in the Western world plan for 20 or 30% of electricity to be delivered from those two sources alone, accompanied by other new technologies.
In Europe, the almost 5 % of solar and wind are very irregularly distributed, with some countries totaling close to 0%, and others already experiencing up to 20% (Denmark) of those renewable sources. All those countries with high shares manage their problems with the significant help of their neighbors. Very small Denmark for example uses the comparably huge water power systems in Norway and Sweden to buffer its heavily variable wind outputs.
This grand plan – to maintain something that already now is highly complex by adding multiple layers of complexity – is something we are very concerned about. The overlying challenge is to keep a flow-based demand system working while stochastic, non-controllable flows gain a significant share of supply, and to do so without jeopardizing grid stability, and at a price which is still affordable. We believe that most people underestimate this challenge and that it actually may be insurmountable. Important: “affordable” in this case doesn’t mean it can be paid by individual households for their relatively small amount of required electricity, as they may be able to bear 20 or 25 cents for a kWh, but instead for an entire industrialized society with the need to provide all the goods and services that make it what is considered “advanced”.
What a high cost of oil does to societies has been well researched and documented in a number of papers (see: http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/ECS/IEW2005/docs/ppt/IEW2005_Maeda.ppt) . High oil prices seem to be a clear inhibitor of economic growth and early indicators of coming recessions. The reason behind this is the fact that the higher the cost for energy is, the less of our efforts can go towards discretionary spending (Hall, Powers and Schoenberg 2008). It is an inherent property of EROI: the energy and money we spend to procure and extract energy, is unavailable to spend on discretionary and non-discretionary investment and consumption.
There is no reason why the situation should be different for energy inputs other than oil, as higher energy costs always leads to this diversion away from consumption and investment. However, creating a benchmark is not easy, as electricity rates have been relatively steady during the times when oil prices fluctuated heavily, which gives us no past reference.
Using oil, where a relatively solid research base exists, we wanted to create a benchmark for “tolerable” electricity prices. Some papers suggest that oil prices that grow from 25 to 35 dollars have a negative impact of 0.3-0.5% on GDP in various countries (http://www.iea.org/papers/2004/high_oil_prices.pdf). We currently are at around $80/barrel, and are still in the middle of a bad crisis, which just looks less bad because governments have started to run up deficits at a breathtaking pace. At $150/barrel, in 2008, the current recession began with a vengeance, and many researchers suggest that high oil prices had their fair share in pricking the problem.
So based on experiences from 2008, we can probably assume that oil prices around $150 per barrel choke many economic activities, as the marginal cost becomes unbearable for many private and commercial consumers alike. Even at the current price of approximately $80/bbl, transportation and other energy-intensive sectors are under heavy pressure, and oil prices push commodity prices up. As a reminder: During the past 50 years, the median price for oil stood at about $25/bbl (inflation adjusted to current dollars). If we look at energy content in a barrel of oil (6.1 GJ or 1700 kWh), a price of $150 translates to a cost per kWh of 8.8 cents, $25 translates to 1.5 cents per kWh in oil.
The difficulty now comes in finding a meaningful comparison between oil and electricity. Oil is a high quality and high density raw energy source with excellent properties with respect to transportation, storage and processing, while electricity provides a distributed service at a comparably high quality. We assume that the same energy content in electricity is of higher value to society when compared to oil, which thus can bear a higher cost for the same amount of energy (this was also part of the Divisia index developed by Cleveland et.al.: http://www.eoearth.org/article/Net_energy_analysis).
One method of comparison would be to compare the ability to convert a specific source to heat (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat5p4.html). To produce the same amount of useful heat, about three times as much oil is required when compared to electricity. So while the lower limit would ask for a direct 1:1 comparison, a “bonus” factor of three for electricity sets the upper limit. However heat – today – is no longer the key use of oil; heat may be produced with natural gas or coal at much lower cost (at less than a third of that of oil). In the predominant applications for crude oil today, transportation fuels and chemicals, electricity is at a clear disadvantage. We therefore decided to assume a bonus for electricity in the middle of the two possible values at 200%, i.e. we attribute twice as much value to a kWh in electricity when compared to crude oil, and equally, set the threshold for economic trouble at twice that of oil.
Under such an assumption, we see in Table 2 that electricity prices become critical at around 9 cents per kWh, equivalent to about $70/barrel of oil, and then unbearable at 15-18 cents (equivalent to 130-150$ oil). This is an average value for an entire industrial society, as wealthy private consumers can tolerate rates even higher than 20 cents per kWh.
But unfortunately, a society doesn’t just consist of consumers; it also needs to produce goods and services, and there, a cost of 15-18 cents will definitely be unacceptable. Given that Chinese manufacturers often operate with final electricity cost between 4-5 cents per kWh, even the 2008 average price paid for industrial electricity of 6.83 cents puts domestic U.S. companies at a significant disadvantage. At today’s electricity levels, highly energy-intensive applications are no longer competitive, which is already visible in industrial trends – it is not only labor-intensive work that is going abroad, energy-intensive industries such as aluminum smelting and steel manufacturing are leaving areas with high electricity cost.
Another method available to create a metric for “acceptable” electricity prices is to use the ratio of electricity cost to total GDP. At the average rate of 9.74 cents per kWh of delivered electricity, all electricity consumption costs the United States about 2.6% of U.S. GDP. If we separate out the industrial portion of GDP (2,737bn US$ in 2008), a similar portion (2.5%) is spent on electricity, at the average price of 6.83 cents. Should this price – for example – triple to 20 cents, suddenly 7.4% of total industrial cost would go towards electricity. This is far more than the profit margins of most energy-intensive industries.
For the U.S., where a large portion of heavy industry has been cut back already due to the relatively high cost of labor and energy compared to other places, such an increase may seem bearable. But what if China would operate under the same regime, replacing current low-cost electricity from coal with expensive new sources? In China, electricity alone totals to approximately 3.5% of GDP at an average cost of 5 cents/kWh, quadrupling the cost per kWh to the same 20 cents would demand that the country diverts 13.8% of its GDP to electricity. This is not feasible, as it – together with oil, coal and natural gas, would divert more than 25% of total GDP towards energy alone – representing a society-level EROI of 4:1. One of the reason why China fares so badly here is because the country provides a lot of the cheap energy Western societies no longer have, and then import it embedded in goods.
If we want to run a complete industrial society, looked at on a global scale, energy prices above certain levels are not sustainable, as they reduce available surpluses for consumption and investment. And unfortunately, those cost levels of 15-20 cents per kWh on average are exactly where societies are headed with the planned changes. We will cover those aspects in more detail further below, when looking at individual technologies.
In order to understand what we need and what we receive from multiple technologies, it seems important to split out the various types of load grid operators have to deal with.
Base load – defined as the long-term minimum demand expected in a region – is usually provided by technologies with relatively low cost, high reliability and limited ability to modulate output. This includes nuclear power plants, lignite coal plants and hydroelectric water mills in rivers. Those plants typically have to operate continuously at relatively stable loads, as otherwise their efficiency is reduced significantly, leading to higher cost per unit of output. Also, re-starting those power plants is relatively time-consuming and inefficient. In most countries, base load capacity is capable of covering approximately 100% of low demand (during nights and weekends).
Intermediate or cyclical load – the foreseeable portion of variety in loads over a day is provided by load-following sources that can modulate to higher or lower output levels – or almost entirely be turned off and on within a relatively short time. However, these sources usually require some lead time to grow or reduce output, for example some coal power plants. Today, natural gas is used for a significant portion of cyclical load.
Peak load – usually required within very short periods of time for a few hours a day – can be provided only from sources that can be turned on and off within minutes, this typically includes gas and small oil power plants as well as stored hydropower (dams or pumped hydro). Peak capacity can be provided by spinning reserve plants (e.g. running plants that can increase capacity quickly) or by non-spinning sources, which can be turned on within minutes.
Beyond technology limitations that make it difficult or uneconomic to ramp capacity up or down quickly, the key factor in the eligibility of a technology for the use in peak, cyclical and base load mode is the cost share between capital investment and fuel cost. The higher the fuel cost share, the more suitable a technology becomes to support peak power; the higher the investment share, the more operational hours are required to arrive at an acceptable average price per kWh. We will look at this issue further below, but this for example is the main reason why nuclear power is such a bad load-following or peak source.
Another point has to do with the flexibility of electricity use, i.e. the possibility of turning something on when supply is abundant, and turning it off when power is scarce. The problem lies with the nature of most uses: many applications are simply inflexible, like those that require something to run for 24 hours a day - data centers are among them, and so are some key industrial processes. Lighting is not flexible, nor is access to heavy uses of electricity in households, such as cooking, using electronics or most kitchen appliances. We also want hot water and cool air when we need it, and usually we don’t want to schedule our laundry because someone tells us to do so, even though this is probably the easiest part. Now some applications, particularly heating (air and water) and cooling (air and goods), indeed have certain flexibility potential. We can run a freezer or air conditioner that produces ice to bridge supply gaps, or we can build a water heater which produces enough hot water to get us through the day, a very common application today in Switzerland, where night energy rates are often half of daytime rates even for households. However, such a time shift comes with tradeoffs: any application that uses storage instead of directly converting electricity into the desired quality output (heat or cold here), ultimately adds cost, for several reasons.
Making equipment flexible comes at a cost, either the cost of information transfer (for price-regulated markets) or the cost of storing the required energy for later use. France has been quite active at experimenting with contracts allowing them to regulate energy according to supply, where customers pay less for power that can be cut off at any point in time. This is especially important in France because of the inflexible nature of their generation technology mix with almost 70% coming from nuclear power. Yet the flexibility French grid operators were able to evoke from that market mechanism, despite the heavy incentives, was around 2-3% of total peak demand (according to RTE, the French grid operator). Most users obviously prefer the inconvenience of higher prices versus the inconvenience of service interruptions, even for things that are not mission-critical. This fact leaves us with approaches that actively shift energy consumption without affecting the end-user. Mostly, this translates to some kind of storage, which has a number of disadvantages.
Every piece of equipment that includes a storage mechanism is significantly more complex than one that operates without, and because of that complexity becomes more expensive, more energy-intensive in its manufacturing, and more exposed to failure. Additionally, each storage process incurs losses. If we produce hot water at night that should last through the entire day, some of the heat dissipates, dependent on how well insulated the storage tank is (again this is dependent on cost and effort, as well as space). The same is true for air-conditioners or freezers that use ice produced at night as buffer – they are less energy efficient overall. Both applications can still be economical for the end user and society as a whole if they use cheap base-load power at night and avoid using peak electricity during the day. Ice-based air-conditioning systems are quite common in office buildings in some parts of the U.S., where utilities charge different rates between night and day. But there is a caveat: all those approaches are geared at balancing two almost steady systems with fully predictable 24 hour cycles, nightly base load production and daily usage patterns with a peak or two. Thus, the maximum storage time required is 10-15 hours, which reduces system complexity as well as conversion and storage losses to acceptable levels. Now with renewable energy supplies, we are suddenly confronted with irregular patterns that can include days to weeks of over- and undersupply. In those cases, storage and conversion losses beyond a few days become almost insurmountable hurdles, as cumulative losses grow quickly over time.
So in a nutshell – there are technical solutions for many of these problems, but often the outcome no longer makes economic sense – neither for the individual user nor for a society.
A key assumption of many forward projections for renewable energy production is that the technology will become cheaper and cheaper over time. Unfortunately, this isn’t true for many technologies, especially as fossil fuel inputs become more expensive.
One of the often cited rules in energy discussions is Moore’s law, which describes the fast advancement of capacity improvements (and price decreases) in computing power. It says that the density of calculation power can double every two years, and has been relatively consistently achieved since 1970. This has led to the fact that a smartphone today has more capacity than large mainframe computers in the early Seventies.
However, outside electronics, Moore’s law does not apply and has never applied for anything. A physical structure remains a physical structure, and does not have the multiplication potential that comes from miniaturization. We may be able to raise the efficiency for a photovoltaic panel from 18 to 20%, but not double it every two years no matter what we do, given the physical limits. The same is true for the materials used for its manufacturing; we might reduce them, but often by 10-20% and sometimes at the cost of more complex tools and purer materials (which also require energy). And erecting a modern wind turbine always requires steel, concrete and many advanced materials, which won’t change, no matter how much we optimize it.
For normal industrial goods, price curves often show an asymptotic form. When a technology is new, neither its production nor its outputs are focused on efficiency; production facilities are small and processes involve a lot of manual labor. Also, new technologies often get produced in advanced economies with higher labor and energy cost. With maturing manufacturing technologies, more efficient and scaled up factories, and the inclusion of lower cost labor and energy from – for example – China, production becomes cheaper and prices fall. Eventually, when labor and production costs become optimized, the decline in price of the product slows, until it reaches a stable retail price more dependent on the raw materials and energy required to produce and transport the good.
In many cases, the picture for raw materials and raw-material-driven products begins to look like the dotted line, despite rapidly growing output:
During the past few years, we have seen this important reversal in this key underlying trend, which briefly visited our economies in 2008 when - with rising resource prices – everything from food to fuels became suddenly more expensive. Thanks to the economic crisis and reduced demand, this phenomenon has partially disappeared, but for some key commodities (such as copper, iron ore, coking coal and some others), we are already back to pre-crisis levels or higher. This is the “glass-half-full” trend, which applies to almost all natural resources, but first and foremost energy. Even if we – as many people correctly state – have enough of something in the ground, getting it out becomes more difficult, has to happen further away and in geopolitically riskier places etc..
This is confirmed by the cost for new power plants, where cost estimates have recently gone up based on higher input cost (for almost everything ranging from nuclear to coal to wind towers), and even for solar panels, the permanent reductions experienced in the past haven’t continued between 2003 and 2008, despite rapidly growing production. The last important cost reduction happened since around 2006, when Chinese manufacturers entered the market, bringing low-cost production energy (mostly coal-based) into the game. Not truly a sustainable model. And, in 2009, due to overcapacity and massively reduced raw material prices, costs came down again, and there might even be more room for some reductions, but this story has an end once input prices go up.
If that core trend of higher energy cost, particularly at the historically lowest-priced end, cannot be reversed, which we doubt it can, this has implications for everything that uses those inputs, as it raises the price with the cost of the raw materials and the energy that go into them. This effect might, in turn, effectively end the trend of lower and lower prices for everything, including energy generation technology, no matter what it is.
Except for solar and wind, most of the technologies currently seen as potential future output providers deliver base load power. This is true for biomass, for geothermal, for nuclear, and to a certain extent for coal. All those generation approaches have only limited load following capabilities, for very different reasons.
Now, stochastic renewable sources (mostly wind) coming into play, often with a “right of passage”, i.e. no limits in selling into the grid at a preferred price. Whoever comes next only gets to sell when there is still demand, and – in a free electricity market like we have it in most OECD countries – that means that prices for coal, nuclear and other base load outputs without a preferred status (biomass mostly has that status), drop sharply. Some analysts have even considered this a positive phenomenon, but actually it is not. What it really does: due to the preference of wind, it pushes marginal price (but not cost) of those steady sources down and thus makes base load generation economically unattractive, because less steady demand at lower prices simply translates to an unacceptable risk for investors. Spot markets are among the key reasons why no more nuclear and hardly any coal power plants were built in Western economies during the past decade.
In a future electricity system, we will see an increasing disparity between a growing pool of inflexible (for cost or technology reasons) base load power, a mission-critical pool of peak and cyclical load capacity, and that new, unpredictable pool of sources that deliver whenever they deliver, irrespective of demand.
If we use some currently available numbers for various electricity generation techniques, we might come up with the following for generation capacity in the United States, without any subsidies:
We are aware of the fact that the above numbers are being disputed, which is why we have included broad ranges. This is not the point we are trying to make – the point is incremental replacement of fossil fuel-based plants, especially cheap coal with more expensive technologies has the potential to lead to large increases in the price of electricity.
Now on top of the generation cost shown in Table 4, we have to bear the cost for maintaining and operating the electricity grid, which delivers the power to homes, offices and factories. For a standard grid today, which does not have to do much more than transmit electricity generated according to demand, this might add about 2-3 cents per kWh. When looking at the cost ranges above, it becomes quite obvious that even the lowest cost sources already bring the total price of electricity dangerously close to what industrial users can afford.
Now on top of the generation cost shown in Table 4, we have to bear the cost for maintaining and operating the electricity grid, of metering, and some profit margins for the utility companies which delivers the power to homes, offices and factories. For the U.S. today, where the grid does not have to do much more than transmit electricity generated according to demand, this adds between 2 and 7 cents per kWh.
When looking at the cost ranges, it becomes quite obvious that even the new lowest cost sources already bring the total price of electricity dangerously close to what industrial users can afford.
And now comes the challenge: Only power that meets someone’s demand has a positive price. If I am asleep and someone offers me free power to light my entire house like a Christmas tree, I don’t care. On the other hand, when the food in my freezer starts to thaw, I would probably be ready to pay a very high price for the few kWh it needs to keep that device going. The same is true in aggregate. Spot electricity prices go as low as 0-3 cents during the night (or even negative, http://www.scribd.com/doc/27816762/Negative-Prices-in-Electricity-Market), and up to 12, 15, sometimes even 50 cents at peak times during the day.
Now what we need to measure in order to understand the entire delivery system is not so much about the prices paid for one kWh of electricity produced, but instead the cost of electricity delivered according to demand. We want to determine how much it costs to provide a kWh from a particular source to supply our human energy demand patterns, and if that doesn’t work in a straightforward manner, we have to estimate the extra cost required to either shift it to the right time, or to shift demand to the time of production. Only once that has been factored in, do we know how expensive a kWh of electricity from a particular source really is.
Sources with little flexibility, such as coal and nuclear or run-of-river hydro plants, mostly produce around the clock. Given their low average cost, the average prices received are profitable, despite the fact that during the night they sell below full cost, but usually above marginal (fuel) cost. The rest (power plant investments, non-flexible operations cost) are incurred irrespective of plant outputs. Thus, adjusting output to more closely meet demand would incur even higher cost (or efficiency losses, or both), put stress on the equipment and require higher operations and maintenance efforts.
If we had to run our grids with just those base load sources, electricity would be more expensive, either from those efficiency losses, from lost overproduction during the night (to still meet peak demand), or from additional measures to shift demand, such as incentives and storage (either in the network or in end-user appliances, as described above). This would add to the basic generation cost. After including these extra efforts, electricity generated in coal or nuclear plants (see section below) would have to sell at a higher price than just the generation plus distribution cost.
Other sources, mostly dammed hydro, oil, and natural gas, are generally able to deliver exactly on time. (hydro only to a limited extent, as certain minimum flows need to be maintained in order to keep ecosystems in rivers below the dam intact). In general, we can turn them up when demand rises, and cut production back as soon as less power is needed. Those sources do not require extra cost on top of their generation cost and the basic effort to operate a grid. A kWh of electricity produced from natural gas thus usually costs approximately 6-10 cents (obviously as long as natural gas prices don’t change).
For sources that don’t have the characteristics described above, things become trickier. We wouldn’t be talking about smart grids, high voltage DC lines, storage in ELVs, and more, if it wasn’t for the fact that most of the sources we want to add to our grid are unpredictable beyond the reach of our weather forecasts. For sources that are capable of producing everything between 0% and 100% of total nameplate capacity at any given time, irrespective of demand, we need to have very different approaches to make them work, and none come cheaply.
So overall, as with all energy sources, we have limits in electricity cost to make it bearable for people. And not for us rich people who plan future energy systems, but also for everybody, and for those industries that manufacture the stuff we all use.
Next week, we will go through a list of all the currently available technologies for generation, transmission and storage, and review total feasibility and cost for each including transmission and grid management, and show certain trends for the future, and, ultimately, provide our assessment as to whether these technologies will be able to deliver what we need to keep grids going.
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Previously in this series:
The Fake Fire Brigade - How We Cheat Ourselves about our Energy Future
Revisiting the Fake Fire Brigade - Part 1
Revisiting the Fake Fire Brigade - Part 2 - Biomass - A Panacea?
Once again I am indebted to MoonofA, who is giving a more detailed hour by hour report, of some of the incidents that I miss. Fairly rapidly on Thursday afternoon, the team of ROVs and surface vessels moved forward with the removal of the existing infrastructure over the Deepwater Horizon well, with the intent of replacing it all with a functioning blowout preventer from the 2nd relief well (which now looks to be no longer necessary at all). One of the first steps was to move the methanol feed (used to dissolve and remove hydrates from the internal structures of the stack) down from the rams of the top stack to feed into the original BOP. This was used to ensure that the different parts of the stack, such as the rams, were able to function, when needed. And now, I presume, the hope is that it will similarly ensure that the BOP rams can function if needed.
Once the feed line had been moved, then the Enterprise came in and lowered the latching device that has been floating just above the stack for the past few days. It did not take long (and by doing so did not convey the difficulty) to drop the cap over the top end of the stack, and not long thereafter the stack was released and lifted away from the underlying transition and the original BOP.
The more interesting part of the exercise will come when they start to lift the original BOP and the transition spool. There are a number of different scenarios that have been proposed, depending on what happens, and why, as the first lift begins. If they can lift the BOP with the underlying drill pipe (DP) still attached, then they appear ready to grab hold of the DP after the BOP has risen a short distance, and cut it off. This will make it easier to get the BOP to the surface, and means that a more conventional fishing tool can be used to capture, and bring up the remaining length of the DP. Toolpush, for example, mentions some of the options available.
The capping stack was released at about 4:30 pm Central, whereupon Admiral Allen issued the following statement:
"Under the direction of the federal science team and U.S. government engineers, BP has completed the capping stack removal procedure – an important step in the process to remove and preserve the damaged BOP. This procedure was undertaken in accordance with specific conditions I set forth in a directive authorizing the capping stack removal and BOP replacement last week. BP will continue to follow these required conditions for the BOP removal procedure, which is expected to commence this evening. I will continue to provide updates as necessary."
One of the problems with the feeds from the Q4000 is that they are not time-stamped, so that it is hard to know if the latest glance at the feed below the moon pool, which shows that the pipe hasn’t moved since I last looked, is current or not.
Another Incident: Mariner Energy Platform Fire
The other significant news today was of the fire on the Mariner Energy platform in the Vermillion block of the Gulf of Mexico. The fire now appears out and there was apparently no leakage from the wells that were connected to the platform. The platform is in 340 ft of water, and was fed by 7 wells collectively supplying 1,400 bd of oil and 9.2 mcf of natural gas, that is now shut in.
I note that they were apparently water-blasting the rig and repainting it. One of the things to be careful of in those cases is the static electric charge that can build up in water vapor around the operation. From the Coast Guard report:
However, at this time, that is just conjecture, and we will have to see what the investigation reveals.
Let us start with persona, since one goes to any prizefight to see the metaphorical battle of two created characters, embodying sides, virtues, faults.
In this Corna... John Michael Greer, owner (by a whisker over Bob Waldrop) of the finest beard in Peak Oildom, Archdruid, moral descendent of Toynbee and Gibbon, considerer of declines in centuries, not weekends. No Zombies for Greer - we are Rome, and we might as well deal with it, dammit.
And in this Corna...Rob Hopkins, beardless founder of the Transition movement, permaculturist, endless energetic optimist and municipal leader, student of the first half of the British century, bent of reorganizing his community and the world to adapt to energy descent. If we could live without that energy once before, well, we can do it now, and let's get at it.
For the record, I like them - and their work - both a lot. I met John Greer for the first time this summer, and immediately felt like I'd met my long-lost older brother - you know, the kind of person you like but can't resist bickering with. We have the same publisher, we agree 85% of the time - and we fight like cats and dogs when we don't. Once we were asked to blurb each other's books, at the same time we were having an online debate, and we ended up proposing mock-insult blurbs for each other. This, I think, is probably a good representative of our relationship.
Hopkins I've never met and am not likely to - both of us adhere to the "stay off the planes" policy for the most part, so the odds are low. But Hopkins and I have emailed back and forth and interacted from time to time. I've written things critical of the Transition movement, and have always been impressed by the good humored and thoughtful way he takes criticism, and by the enormous amount of work he does. It is impossible to overstate how impressive Hopkins' accomplishments in essentially creating the Transition movement are.
In some ways, I think of the three of us and some other people as the "second wave" of emergent peak oil writers - our accomplishments and worldviews are different, but as peak oil thinkers we have some essential commonalities. By this I mean that the first wave, which began in 1997 with Colin Campbell's publication of his first paper on peak oil, and included a large number of petroleum geologists (Ken Deffeyes), some political scientists (Michael Klare) and a mix of early-aware writers (Richard Heinberg), folks working out of their fields but doing important research (Julian Darley and Matt Simmons) and journalists (Jim Kunstler). That first wave of books was mostly about raising the alarm and awareness - and it was extremely effective and important. Most of us can date some measure of our awareness to books like _Twilight in the Desert_, _The Party's Over_, _Beyond Oil_ and _The Long Emergency_.
These books were mostly about raising the alarm, doing the difficult work of telling a public never educated about petroleum production or resource depletion how we know this might happen, why they should be worried, and what a post-peak future might look like. And they were enormously successful and important books, most of them published before 2005, and most of them still being read now by people who are still experiencing a sudden "oh crap" recognition of the data they are seeing.
The second generation of us came along around that time, I think, for the most part, give or take a year. We'd read the books. We had spent our time reading the latest figures and the data. We knew what the books said was true - and built from there. And we emerged precisely because all the first generation peak oil thinkers had already laid the groundwork for us. There was now a population, however small, of people who have grasped that the world can't go on this way - and that population was ready for a more complicated narrative of what that would mean for them. All of us began, I think from asking that question "what will this world look like?" And then "what do we do next?"
My first speaking gig was pretty much at the cusp of this moment of emergence into a new focus - in September 2006, I spoke at the Community Solutions conference on peak oil, the third one they'd ever held. The speakers included Heinberg and Darley, and both of them gave speeches they clearly had given often before - speeches explaining the issues, describing the resource problems, with lots of slides and data. And for the first time at these conferences, the audience wasn't that engaged - don't get me wrong, the presentations were good, but for the very first time, the audience had heard it before and had enough time to absorb the information. I think that's one of the reasons I was reasonably successful there - because I started from the implicit presumption that we all pretty much knew this stuff. A year earlier, I don't think I could have done that. Without building on those who came before me, I couldn't have done it.
The second wave of peak oil writers is a pretty weird group, frankly. There's Hopkins, a permaculturist professional optimist mantra is pretty much "if pre-petroleum Britain could do it, we can" and who spends a lot of time on pre-war Britain. There's Greer, the Druid and lover of long dead historians who sees in us falling empire a la Rome. There's me, the leftist feminist farmer/social history type who sees this in terms of a mix of home economics, social history and WWII agitprop. There's Dmitry Orlov, the funniest of us, the Russian boatman who sees in the US the Soviet Collapse. There's Nate Hagens, who sees this through an evolutionary psychology lens, with a focus on finance. There's Ran Prieur who is hard to categorize, but sees it all as kind of a zen thing, inevitable in human development. There's Amanda Kovattana who comes at this from a leftist, internationalist "stick it to Global Industrial society" perspective, and Nicole Foss who comes at this through money and energy like Hagens, but with a focus on finance and economic history. There are others too, I'm not trying to do a full cover the landscape here, just give you a sense of how weird this is (there's also a third wave, which I'll write about another time).
What's interesting about the second wave is that quite honestly, given our short summary identities, you'd think no one would read us. I mean that quite seriously - who the heck wants to view the fall of the world through a feminist literary domestic historian turned farmer turned science writer? If you were writing an ad "read the Toynbee loving archdruid about catabolic collapse" would probably not sell. I don't think you could pitch a book to an American publisher cold by saying "this is how the US is pretty much just like the Soviet Union, except not as healthy during the inevitable collapse." I know that when I started blogging I pretty much thought that maybe my Mom would read it - once. And yet, that's not what happened - for any of us.
Now you could use this as proof of the insanity of the peak oil movement, but I don't think so - or rather I don't think that's all there is to it. I think it was, instead, proof of something else - the desperate desire of many people to go from "here's what is happening" to "now what?" And there are a lot of answers to that "now what" question - a lot of different ways to look at the world, a lot of different ways to predict what will happen, a lot of different ways to organize, a lot of different ways to respond, a lot of different experiences to work from. And a surprising number of people have found that somewhere in the interstices between all of these rather strange worldviews, a common set of useful assumptions has started to emerge - not that any of us has a whole picture, but that between us, readers can begin to garner a worldview.
At the same time, each of us writers is locked up somewhat in our head and our experiences, with our sense - often strong sense - of what may happen and how it will happen. As writers, we are largely rewarded for unified worldview - that is, one of the things that gets people reading us is that we have a particular and unique vision that we can make into a coherent (or in my case, semi-coherent) narrative. This is extremely useful to a lot of people - because it helps them envision things. Through our writings and our eyes they come to look at the events unfolding differently. And my sense is that a lot of readers develop a complex, nuanced vision of how this works, precisely by looking through all of us second wave writers' eyes. Sure, we all have our primary adherents - people who read just us - but a lot of folks read us all, at least some of the time.
I think that's why I think the emerging consensus of almost all the comments on Greer and Hopkins' respective blogs about their battle over Transition vs. Green Wizardry is that both are probably more valuable than either one. Indeed, Hopkins and Greer have pretty much agreed that they agree on the most important things while still thinking that their disagreements matter. And that's probably good - but I hope that the pressure to emphasize agreements won't stop them from fighting. Maybe that's a weird thought, but it is true (I have faith that it isn't really a danger ;-)).
I too disagree with Greer and Hopkins - fairly regularly, actually. Some of the disagreements are trivial - I think a lot of Transition activities I've encountered function as the kind of spirit-building activities that I absented myself from as frequently as possible in high school. I love appropriate technology, but I admit, like Hopkins I don't think the best stuff ever came out in the 70 - some of it sure, (I still don't know why Hopkins goes hatin' on Ruth Stout ;-)), but I don't see the case for 70s publications over say, the work of Scott Kellogg and RUST in the present. This is totally trivial stuff, though.
Then there are the serious ones - I think Greer gets climate change really, really wrong, and have written before about why I think that is. I think his long view erases deep suffering in the short term, and focuses only on the rich world. I think Hopkins' refusal to deal seriously with a harder, faster crash possibility sometimes undercuts the potential utility of Transition - the deep problem I see with Transition is that it only works if there's plenty of time to make it work. I also think that the municipal level may be too large for many communities - that the most urgent work has to be done at the neighborhood level.
I think the criticisms we make of each other matter - and we deal with each other most fiercely probably when there's truth in those critiques. There is, frankly, truth in Hopkins' observation that the 70s appropriate technology may not be the best place to start. There is truth in Greer's point that just because you organize doesn't mean that your organization strategies actually will function in a decline. There is truth in the critiques they've levelled at me over the years.
Whenever these debates go on, a lot of people try to smooth them over by observing we all have more in common than not. And that's absolutely true, but maybe the difference matter more than they credit for. At the recent gathering where I met Greer in person for the first time, Dmitry Orlov, Nate Hagens, Greer and I were all together with Heinberg and a group of other people, trying to describe the future. And what we found was that those different lenses did lead to a 90% overlap in worldview. Most of what we were telling people was the same. Most of the strategies we were advising were mostly the same. In the end, the realities of peak oil, climate change and the consequences of our wild financial overextension led to a largely similar set of parameters.
That's why Greer's Green Wizards and Hopkins' Transitioners and my readers are all focused on shifting the food system. That's why Nate Hagens' sense that this is mostly our neurology pushing us down the wrong path and Prieur's sense that we are drawn to overextension by our inner natures are so close. This is why Nicole Foss, Dmitry Orlov and Amanda Kovattna are all so concerned with how people will hold on to housing. When you turn your head to the realities we are facing - a lot fewer resources, more people, a less stable climate, a less stable economy, environmental degradation, the stories aren't that different. All of us reject the idea of cartoon apocalypse. All of us reject the idea of techno-optimism. All of us live in the grey middle space of the future.
And at some level, all of us are consumed with the need to imagine that space and that future. I think all of us would probably agree that a future we can't imagine is the scariest possible place. Even the dark places of a society in decline are less disturbing than knowing that the stories you've been told about progress and techno-optimism are false, but not knowing what lies ahead, living in a world where all the maps of beyond just say "here be dragons."
I do not, however, want to emerge from this with a lyrical praise of our common ground, a sense that the differences don't matter. In fact, I suspect they do - I think there is real value in the battles, in what one commenter calls "dueling blogs" - and it isn't necessarily in the emergence, as we have here, of the clear common ground. Sure, that's useful, but you can get that from any one of us. What's most valuable instead is that between the second wave peak oil writers, the emerging third wave, countless others I haven't mentioned for lack of space and the continued and deeply important work of the first wave, between all those thinkers and their ideas, their investment in theory and worldview, and their organizations and the work they set out to do, there's a better picture emerging than any of us could have made on our own.
Greer thus chastizes me for having too short a view of history. I accuse him of erasing the suffering of the short view. Hopkins argues for community organizing strategies. Orlov points out that his direct experience is that those communities are self-organizing. And all of us are picking up on real faults in the thinking of others - not all the truth, but real faults sometimes, and new ways of thinking sometimes. The interstitial spaces have probably the greatest degree of truth in them - that the long and the short view will both be lived, that communities will both self-organize in unpredictable ways and be served by previous organization. The fighting is at least as important as the agreeing.
Sharon
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Long weekend reading: Over at e360, Climate Central's Michael Lemonick sums up the latest thinking on the big question of whether clouds will alleviate or accelerate global warming.
climatecode.org is a new project from the clear climate code folks - go have a look. And maybe even do something :-). It am all de rage at the moment to dothis stuff, and it will be interesting how "open source" attempts mesh together with more heavyweight government backed efforts. What next - "clear climate reviews" to replace the next IPCC report?
ps: sorry abut the silly slider-bar thingy at the bottom, if it is still there when you see this: I think that Seed must be experimenting with some new widgety stuff. I wish they wouldn't do that.
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(Note: due to blockages in the intertubes, this week's installment is late. Apologies to all whose week ground to a halt while anxiously waiting...)
Dr. Isis's favorite little academic society is on ScienceBlogs. The American Physiological Society started the LifeLines blog about a month ago. In addition to their fantastic podcasts being available there, Dr. Dolittle, a comparative physiologist, shares interesting bits about the physiology of different species.
Go check them out. They are putting up some terrific stuff.
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It isn't that I'm not athletic, I am - but my strengths in the athletic zone were never speed and agility - more forceful forward motion and tough elbows in basketball games. I've never been the kind of person who makes that rolling catch to save the game.
Until now. You see, I've got a new sport - the baby goat roundup. This is definitely a speed and agility event, and I am now the queen.
You see, we let our goats roam loose. Believe it or not, they don't go wandering into the road, but stay in the pastures. We only do it when someone is around to keep an eye on them (the rest of the time they are fenced), but otherwise, we give them the run of the landscape. Most of the time someone is either outside, or half-watching from a nearby window, and they have several acres to roam and browse, plenty of overhanging woody stuff, and no real reason to go out of bounds. The goats are pretty domesticated - they want to be near you, so often they mostly just follow us around, browsing wherever we're working. The herd stays largely together, within close range, so you know where one is, they all pretty much are. This larger range reduces parasite exposure, and gives them easy access to shelter if a drop of rain should fall (goats melt when it rains, or so they think ;-)). It means less water hauling too. It will probably end next year, when we have more goats, but so far, it has worked well for us.
The only problem with this is that there is a period between a few days after a baby goat's birth and about four weeks of age, where they don't really follow the herd. For the first few days they stay close to Mom and sleep a lot, just like human babies, and by around four weeks they start to follow the herd, nibble the grass and recognize that they belong as part of the group. But for the three weeks in the interim, they are kind of their own little daycare group, busy playing king of the hill and racing around, napping or playing with the chickens. They simply don't work in unity.
Now when we need to put the goats somewhere we want them - say, we are going out and need to put everyone in the fenced pasture or perhaps it is bedtime and we want them in the barn (we have a den of coyotes across the road and baby goats are snack-sized), we must gather the goats together. Now this is incredibly easy with the adults and the babies over 4 weeks - we shake the grain or carry a flake of hay, and everyone comes following to get the goodies. But the babies in that interim place are oblivious to this. They don't care about grain or hay yet - food comes mostly from Mom.
Right now we have 9 - yes, 9 cat-sized baby goats who don't yet follow the bucket. And every time we want them to go somewhere, instead of them following calmly along, we have to catch them. And they don't want to be caught. In many cases they do want to come in - and they want to be with their Moms, but they express this by racing around like maniacs, not by going where it would be useful, or allowing us to catch them.
Thus, the baby goat roundup is my new sport, and it should definitely be shown on ESPN. At least once a day (bedtime) and often more than that, we go out and catch all the babies and dump them in the barn. Now catching nine moving baby goats that are faster than you, more agile and small enough to go under any obstacle that would trip you is, well, it is a challenge.
The thing is, it is also kind of fun. So you hear the call "ok, I'm going to go round up the babies...who wants to help!" and off we all go with shouted instructions "Isaiah, you chase them out from under the wheelbarrow and I'll corner them behind the rainbarrel!" "Ok, babe, you chase that pair into the hay barn and I'll close the doors..." "Oh, crap, missed Basil."
There's strategy. There's sheer exuberance. There's speed. There's flashy stuff - like when you scoop up two babies at once. There's teamwork, and showboating and sweat dripping off you. There's everything you want in a sport. Seriously, this should be in the olympics. It would get one bazillion viewer due to sheer cuteness and comic value.
And I scored my first-ever touchdown! We'd managed to get everyone but Goldenrod after considerable effort. My aunt Luana was visiting and taking pictures and laughing hysterically at the sight of Eric, I and three of the four boys attempting to corner one goat - finally, he made around the edge of the pasture fence, and Simon chased him to back towards me - Eric tried missed him, and I dived and made a spectacular rolling catch, grabbed him just as he was leaping off, and lay on my back in the pasture holding the baby goat heroically above my head. Touchdown!
I'm not sure if my aunt got a picture of this or not - she may have been laughing too hard to click the shutter, although I'll definitely post it here if she sends me one - after all, I've got few enough great sporting moments that this one is one to treasure. Olympics, here I come!
Sharon
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Der Spiegel reports that it has obtained a German military think tank's analysis of peak oil's implicatons - and that the implications of the report are that the German government sees a peak oil scenario as potentially serious and likely enough to require attention:
The issue is so politically explosive that it's remarkable when an institution like the Bundeswehr, the German military, uses the term "peak oil" at all. But a military study currently circulating on the German blogosphere goes further.
The study is a product of the Future Analysis department of the Bundeswehr Transformation Center, a think tank tasked with fixing a direction for the German military. The team of authors, led by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Will, uses sometimes-dramatic language to depict the consequences of an irreversible depletion of raw materials. It warns of shifts in the global balance of power, of the formation of new relationships based on interdependency, of a decline in importance of the western industrial nations, of the "total collapse of the markets" and of serious political and economic crises.
The study, whose authenticity was confirmed to SPIEGEL ONLINE by sources in government circles, was not meant for publication. The document is said to be in draft stage and to consist solely of scientific opinion, which has not yet been edited by the Defense Ministry and other government bodies.
The lead author, Will, has declined to comment on the study. It remains doubtful that either the Bundeswehr or the German government would have consented to publish the document in its current form. But the study does show how intensively the German government has engaged with the question of peak oil.
Spiegel also notes that this parallels recently released documents in Britain that indicate concern in the British government about an energy supply crisis - and indeed, this shouldn't be surprising as the IEA has been warning about an impending supply crisis for several years now. The Bundeswehr report places peak oil as possibly around 2010 and sees the following consequences:
Oil will determine power: The Bundeswehr Transformation Center writes that oil will become one decisive factor in determining the new landscape of international relations: "The relative importance of the oil producing nations in the international system is growing. These nations are using the advantages resulting from this to expand the scope of their domestic and foreign policies and establish themselves as a new or resurgent regional, or in some cases even global leading power."
Increasing importance of oil exporters: For importers of oil more competition for resources will mean an increase in the number of nations competing for favour with oil producing nations. For the latter this opens up a window of opportunity which can be used to implement political, economic or ideological aims. As this window of time will only be open for a limited period, "this could result in a more aggressive assertion of national interests on the part of the oil producing nations."
Politics in place of the market: The Bundeswehr Transformation Center expects that a supply crisis would roll back the liberalization of the energy market. "The proportion of oil traded on the global, freely accessible oil market will diminish as more oil is traded through bi-national contracts," the study states. In the long run, the study goes on, the global oil market, will only be able to follow the laws of the free market in a restricted way. "Bilateral, conditioned supply agreements and privileged partnerships, such as those seen prior to the oil crises of the seventies, will once again come to the fore."
Market failures: The authors paint a bleak picture of the consequences resulting from a shortage of petroleum. As the transportation of goods depends on crude oil, international trade could be subject to colossal tax hikes. "Shortages in the supply of vital goods could arise" as a result, for example in food supplies. Oil is used directly or indirectly in the production of 95% of all industrial goods. Price shocks could therefore be seen in almost any industry and throughout all stages of the industrial supply chain. "In the medium term the global economic system and every market-oriented national economy would collapse."
Relapse into planned economy: Since virtually all economic sectors rely heavily on oil, peak oil could lead to a "partial or complete failure of markets," says the study. "A conceivable alternative would be government rationing and the allocation of important goods or the setting of production schedules and other short-term coercive measures to replace market-based mechanisms in times of crisis."
Global chain reaction: "A restructuring of oil supplies will not be equally possible in all regions before the onset of peak oil," says the study. "It is likely that a large number of states will not be in a position to make the necessary investments in time," or with "sufficient magnitude." If there were economic crashes in some regions of the world, Germany could be affected. Germany would not escape the crises of other countries, because it's so tightly integrated into the global economy.
Crisis of political legitimacy: The Bundeswehr study also raises fears for the survival of democracy itself. Parts of the population could comprehend the upheaval trigged by peak oil "as a general systemic crisis." This would create "room for ideological and extremist alternatives to existing forms of government." Fragmentation of the affected population is likely and could "in extreme cases lead to open conflict."
None of this is a real surprise if you've been paying attention - these are the logical consequences of an impending oil peak for the world and for individual nations. But what is important is that these issues are finally being taken seriously at national levels. It is almost certainly too late to make any kind of a smooth transition, but it is also the case that almost any kind of functional, non-destructive preparation to protect ordinary people could have enormous effect. It is simply about time.
Sharon
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Yesterday I was on the phone with my Rabbi, who was asking me for data bout the BP oil spill and wanted to know whether there was any connection to peak oil. I told him that there certainly is - the BP oil spill is in many measures a consequence of a society under deep pressure to develop every conceivable source of oil, at great monetary, energy and ecological cost. The connection to peak oil is obvious - once upon a time, one dug a well in the ground and oil came spurting up - the version of oil prospecting one can still see in Bugs Bunny Cartoons today.
Now increasingly, the world's discoveries, which are coming at a rate that in no way compensates for the drastically higher rate of consumption, are often deepwater sites that are enormously costly to develop, politically contested or ecologically sensitive sites we wouldn't have considered before. Now instead of spurting out, we use ever more expensive technologies to extract oil deep in rock or to pump seawater to keep up pressure in aging oil fields. In the end, the Deepwater Horizon disaster, for all of the regulatory failures and failures of BP itself, is most of all a consequence of our desperation to keep the oil flowing - and the fact that we are living with the consequences of being nearly 50 years past the peak of discovery, almost 40 years past the peak of US production, and probably five years past world conventional oil production peak. And the reality is that unless we learn to use vastly less oil, the pursuit of compensatory resources from ever-more-sensitive and ever-harder-to-get-to sites will result in more disasters - period.
I admit, I didn't expect to see one quite so quickly though - and we don't know whether what just happened in the Gulf is an equivalent event, or whether this too is a result primarily of our drive for more, more. But here's what we do know, via the
AP and the New York Times:
An offshore petroleum platform exploded and was burning Thursday in the Gulf of Mexico about 80 miles off the Louisiana coast, west of the site where BP's undersea well spilled after a rig explosion.
The Coast Guard says no one was killed in the blast, which was reported by a commercial helicopter flying over the area Thursday morning. All 13 people aboard the rig have been accounted for, with one injury. The extent of the injury was not known.
Seven Coast Guard helicopters, two airplanes and three cutters were dispatched to the scene from New Orleans, Houston and Mobile, Ala., Ben-Iesau said. She said authorities do not know whether oil was leaking from the site.
The Department of Homeland Security said the platform was in about 2,500 feet of water and owned by Mariner Energy of Houston. DHS said it was not producing oil and gas.
It is too early to know what the results of this explosion will be, and I'm just grateful that this time the workers have survived. But again, I think it bears reiteration - you can tighten regulations, you can certainly reduce the number of accidents, but the danger to us and our planet is a consequence of the way we consume resources. The problem cannot in any way be outsourced. I hope we dodge the bullet this time, and there is no spill - but we won't dodge it forever.
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Read the comments on this post...An offshore oil rig exploded in the Gulf of Mexico on Thursday, west of the site of the April blast that caused the massive oil spill.
A commercial helicopter company reported the blast around 9:30 a.m. CDT Thursday, Coast Guard Petty Officer Casey Ranel said. Seven helicopters, two airplanes and four boats were en route to the site, about 80 miles south of Vermilion Bay along the central Louisiana coast.
The Coast Guard said initial reports indicated all 13 crew members from the rig were in the water. One was injured, but there were no deaths.
The document warns of the potential for regional shortages, market failures, and a shift in political power toward those capable of exporting oil. This report describes potential outcomes that require planning and preparation. The scenarios outlined in the paper are exactly the kinds of drivers that lead me to advocate for greater regional energy self-sufficiency. The report clearly lays out just how vulnerable Europe will be because of its continuing dependence upon Russia for both oil and gas, and notes that Russia will be in a very strong political bargaining position as a result.
The report can be accessed from the popular German paper Der Spiegel in this story: Bundeswehr-Studie warnt vor dramatischer Ölkrise. The report is so far only available in German, and while Ich spreche ein wenig Deutsch (I speak a little German), I am not fluent enough to capture the essence of the report. (Der Spiegel has summarized the report in English now: Military Study Warns of a Potentially Drastic Oil Crisis).
However, I have a friend who is both fluent in German (his native tongue) and passionate about peak oil outreach. Given a week, I could probably translate the report. My friend (who didn't want to be identified) did it overnight. Below is his translation of the major points in the report.
July 2010
The focus of the document is on the topic of finite resources, using Peak Oil as an example. The report is part of a series of publications focused on the long term (30 years) with the intent to enable the Ministry of Defense to take action early.
In the past, resources have always triggered conflicts, mostly of regional nature. For the future, the authors expect this to become a global problem, as scarcity (mainly of crude oil) will affect everybody.
The authors confirm multiple views on Peak Oil timing and concede that there will be Peak Oil eventually. The study isn’t about positioning the problem on a timeline, but instead about the consequences of a peak. They expect major consequences with a delay of 15-30 years after the peak has hit.
The report refers to the uncertainty of reserve statements mainly in OPEC countries based on the quota allocation method within OPEC but also refers to the possibility of better extraction technologies.
They suggest that it has become urgent to understand those consequences of an eventual peak now in order to have enough time to adapt.
95% of all industrial outputs is dependent on oil as a fuel and/or as a chemical base for polymer production etc. Oil has become a key driver of modern lifestyle and globalization.
Substantial oil price increases poses a systemic risk, not just for obvious things like transportation, but equally for other subsystems.
Thus, internationally, but equally nationally, there is a vital interest in securing access to oil, which is currently possible on world spot markets, with OPEC being cooperative due to a mutual dependency between key actors (and a massive presence of the U.S military in the Gulf region).
Yet, on the other hand, regional conflicts can always at least partially be attributed to resources, such as in the Caucasus region, the Middle East or in Nigeria. They may also fuel conflicts due to the wealth they create (such as in Africa).
The report sees – within a timeframe until the year 2040 – a changed international security layout based on new risks (including transport risks for fuels) and new roles of actors in a possible conflict around the distribution of increasingly scarce resources.
The term is defined narrowly as “reliable energy supply”, and then extended to include environmental objectives, technology transformation of societies, planning for energy demand and the long-term planning of a national strategy, tied in with international organizations.
This expansion of the view is seen as required based on the globalization of energy markets. However, the report then narrows in scope again to the possible risk from a supply shock, focusing on the key suppliers of oil: Russia, Norway and the U.K. It is noted that both European partners are already past their peak and that Germany is increasingly dependent on Russia, which currently is reliable but not necessarily so in the long term. Given the expected decline in German energy consumption, the Russian share will likely be 40% by 2025, with the Middle East, Africa and sources around the Caspian Sea making up for the increasing gap from declining European production.
This chapter looks at gradual changes (3.1.) and the risk of disruptive changes (3.2) past a certain tipping point.
3.1.1 Oil as a deciding factor in international relationships
With increasing scarcity, producers are increasingly in an advantageous position, both from high revenues and access to cheaper oil when compared to spot market prices. This partly reverses the trend to free oil markets which took place after the '70s shocks, and gives those countries more control over the supply chain, with a risk of monopolies and nationalizations, and of “political pricing.”
Further, oil producers use increasing amounts of their production internally at lower prices, which increases domestic consumption and inefficiencies, accelerating the problem. [The authors miss out on the fact that high oil prices also bring more wealth to the country which AGAIN increases resource consumption].
The report then looks at increasing “strategic” moves by key actors including the Chinese CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation), which tries to grab the sources that are still available (particularly in Asia and Africa), but often at relatively unattractive conditions.
Overall, the authors expect a reduction of “free market” mechanisms in oil trade, and a rise in more protectionism, exchange deals, and political alliances between suppliers and customers, which could lead to significant geopolitical shifts. Equally, the authors expect this interdependency to shape foreign affairs of oil importers, making them more tolerant towards rogue behavior of suppliers out of sheer need.
Overall, higher volatility and loss of trust are seen as possible outcomes in a world where oil supplies are limited, increasing the need for “oil related diplomacy” and thus increasing the risk of moral hazard among all actors, which in turn decreases overall global supply security.
The report then refers to already existing actions of the German government to tie close economic relationships with energy suppliers, and to the tendency of consuming countries to reduce oil dependency, trying to steer clear of risks of future supply shocks.
The Middle East is identified as a very dangerous region with high external involvement from many players and thus a very unstable overall situation.
Overall, the report expects a reduction of the importance of “Western values” related to democracy, and human rights in the context of politically motivated alliances, which increasingly are driven by emerging economies such as China – likely leading to double standards. Emerging economies are equally expected to receive higher recognition in international organizations, particularly those with strength in resources (such as Russia).
3.1.2 New security risks based on additional/alternative energy resources
New conflicts are potentially arising from oil exploration in international or disputed ocean waters, where multiple issues arise, particularly around the Arctic Circle, with further geopolitical risks for conflict.
Also, the shift to natural gas is reviewed as an extension of the “oil age”, because it might be able to replace crude oil as a bridging source until new solutions are found. The risks for problems from transporting gas (pipelines) and the related issues (as seen between Russia and its neighbors during the past years) are highlighted.
Equally, nuclear power as a potential source is highlighted – emphasizing the risk for safety and the proliferation of nuclear technology. This would also require an increasing shift towards electricity.
Equally, the competition between biofuel and food production is highlighted, showing the limits of biofuel outputs to compensate for reductions in oil availability, and also showing risks for water supply and soil degradation from excessive use.
Overall, the authors see a trend to increase the energy autonomy of entire regions from external supplies, both in the ability to generate alternative fuels (from biofuels and coal), but particularly in electricity generation.
3.1.3 A shift in roles between private and public actors
Based on the increasing importance of oil, governments are becoming more relevant in securing the benefits of oil, both on the supply and on the demand side. This puts a higher emphasis on political negotiations and deals, and increases the risks for nationalizations of resources and key exploration activities.
Exploration licenses are seen as a key area where bidding wars (including non-financial commitments) might emerge. Equally, increasing pressure to renegotiate or revoke already existing licenses might emerge. Ultimately, each country will try to secure sufficient oil to maintain its standard of living.
On the other hand, private enterprises are seen on the rise in protecting infrastructure and ensuring production and transportation security in less developed regions, particularly if weaker countries become unable to keep their own services up.
The dependency on oil-related infrastructure (pipelines, refineries, harbors, key pathways on oceans) will increase, and thus the risk. Damaging infrastructure through hostile acts (sabotage, war) might become an attractive target for groups or countries with a tendency to use violence. The same is expected for electricity and natural gas-related infrastructure – they all might require higher protection.
Generally, the focus of risks is expected in the region which the authors consider the “strategic ellipse” (a term used for the region East of Europe reaching from Saudi Arabia in the South to Russia and former Soviet Union countries in the North), because a majority of oil reserves are located in this area.
3.1.4 Economic and political crises as a consequence of the transition to “post-fossil” societies
A number of risks of higher oil prices are seen for modern economies, particularly in transportation. Security risks are seen in resulting systemic crises.
A first direct consequence of higher oil prices and lower availability of fossil fuels is a possible reduction in transportation capacity, equally in individual transportation and in freight forwarding. This might lead to another “mobility crisis” for societies that heavily depend on cars and trucks.
Higher cost in commercial transportation markets might severely affect current supply chains, and no alternatives are in sight (electric trucks don’t exist yet). Food particularly might become a critical issue for countries that are a) highly dependent on imports and b) are susceptible to price-increases of food products, particularly affecting Africa, parts of Asia and Latin America, and the Middle East.
High oil prices would further affect almost all aspects of society, as it will also influence the cost of chemicals and all products derived from them, which might substantially alter the nature of value chains and make certain things uneconomical – ultimately leading to higher unemployment during a transformational phase away from an oil based economy. This might particularly affect the German car industry.
Limits in availability might also strengthen regulatory efforts, encourage the allocation of energy (oil) by rationing schemes and possible other actions limiting free markets.
Additionally, the changes and likely reduction in standard of living might render societies less stable and make them more attracted to extremist political positions and even trigger changes in government systems, as trust into key actors in politics will diminish. This might be a particular risk for the relatively young democratic countries in Eastern Europe.
3.1.5 More selective intervention – key actors overwhelmed
Overall, more expensive transportation and increasing problems “at home” might reduce the ability of larger countries to intervene internationally (politically and/or with military action), and also lower the readiness to provide help to poorer countries. The focus will be more on a country's (energy) interest for itself and not so much on an ideal of transferring Western values. The gap will likely not be filled by NGOs, as they will be affected by similar limits.
Overall, international institutions will be weakened, as they will have less resources to provide help and support, and it becomes equally possible that help will be attached to direct (energy) needs of the donors.
In addition to the gradual risks, there might be risks of non-linear events, where a reduction of economic output based on Peak Oil might affect market-driven economies in a way that they stop functioning altogether, leaving the possibility of a relatively steady downward trajectory.
Such a scenario could develop through an initially slow decline of trade and economic activity, combined with higher stress on government budgets from lower tax income, higher social cost and growing investment into alternative technologies.
Investment will decline and debt service will be challenged, leading to a crash in financial markets, accompanied by a loss of trust in currencies and a break-up of value and supply chains – because trade is no longer possible. This would in turn lead to the collapse of economies, mass unemployment, government defaults and infrastructure breakdowns, ultimately followed by famines and total system collapse.
Oil as a new factor of global power would create significant dependencies for Germany, and in order to avoid supply issues, strong ties with suppliers are a must, but equally a diversification of supply relationships, taking into account that a supplier might intentionally reduce capacity to accomplish political objectives.
Among the key supplier countries is Russia (supplying 35% of German oil imports), where reliability risks are prevalent, given past experience. Natural gas, as a possible temporary substitute, bears the same risk (37% comes from Russia). Thus, a diversification becomes essential.
Germany needs strong and reliable ties to Russia and other Caspian Sea countries. This might create some challenges in international relations, particularly with smaller Eastern European countries [like Poland]. Thus, intensifying relationships to the Middle East might be equally relevant. However, all those relationships have an inherent risk of being instruments in conflicts, which puts a certain limit on treating all foreign partners the same.
The need to mitigate supply risks might require some compromises on foreign affairs topics (such as human rights). Equally, more active diplomatic efforts will be required with a focus of energy security in mind. This is more difficult given Germany’s reluctance to engage in political power play due to its history, but needs to be tackled in order to deal with the challenges ahead. The authors don’t want to encourage military solutions, but suggest a strong preventive development of political and diplomatic initiatives to tackle the problem.
All industrial nations that depend on energy imports will become more dependent on new partners, both in emerging economies and supplier countries. This requires a new focus in foreign affairs, sometimes giving up standards in negotiations with countries that have different cultures and political systems.
Some supplier countries (and surrounding regions) might be destabilized by the force of higher resource prices. This is an area where Germany needs to help by providing support for nation building and conflict resolution on the national and international level. This is in conflict with the lower economic power likely to result from Peak Oil, which might make interventions less likely and requires new approaches of “stabilization with lower effort.”
Germany might have to take positions in case of an upcoming conflict regarding resources in the Arctic Circle, where multiple countries (including Russia) have open claims for accessing oil and gas fields. This requires further research.
The risk for nuclear technology proliferation and thus more countries with the potential for nuclear weapons (and the risk for terrorists having access to nuclear material) is growing due to the proliferation of nuclear technology for energy generation. Equally, risks for terrorist attacks and accidents on German soil are rising. Both scenarios require more surveillance, intelligence and preventive action.
Energy delivery infrastructure for all sources including electricity will have a higher importance in an oil constrained world, thus, securing its reliability, security and availability becomes mission-critical. International cooperation is needed to secure large international supply paths (pipelines, sea routes).
The expectation of stronger connections between suppliers and consumers across continents creates different settings for current international alliances and security risks. DESERTEC (a large power production system in Northern Africa based on CSP) would require different settings even for military strategies.
Armed forces would also be significantly affected by fossil fuel limits, as they are very dependent on oil products. Significant investments in alternative energy procurement technologies (biofuels, coal-to-liquids - Fischer-Tropsch) and applications (electric and hybrid vehicles) would be required, with long transition times. Further, local energy-independence of stationary troop infrastructure (like military bases) using more renewable sources would be beneficial. The long term objective would be to fully convert Germany’s armed forces to only use renewable energy sources by 2100.
For scenarios which end with a complete destabilization of societies, Germany is at a significant risk given its strong participation in a globalized economy. Being still able to act requires a number of basic infrastructures to keep functioning, both for the country and its armed forces. Work is required to look into redundancy, high-resilience of infrastructure and local self-organization approaches.
The report sees significant risks arising from an unavoidable peak in oil production, which go beyond gradual shifts in energy systems and economies. This will likely lead to economic change and new geopolitical risks that affect much more than just what we can anticipate. The overall ability to describe exact outcomes is very limited, as many scenarios are possible, and further research is required.
Overall, more emphasis needs to be put on understanding and shaping international relationships with respect to energy security, anticipating and integrating the ongoing shift to different players in a resource-constrained world.
In any case, Germany has to identify and implement alternatives to the current transportation technologies that require oil, and put a similar emphasis on avoiding other dependencies, for example concerning rare earths.
For armed forces, Peak Oil creates significant risks, both from a mobility standpoint as well as from dependencies on other societal services. Understanding those risks requires further analysis and likely a very different approach in the future.
In general, more preparation is required for society and the army to make sure that problems are recognized and solutions are actively implemented.
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Update, 6:00pm Thursday: The cap was removed from the well late Thursday afternoon. The next step will be removing the blow-out preventer, which is considered forensic evidence.
The annotations to the ROV feeds from BP are becoming a little more descriptive, particularly with those related to the Q4000, which will be playing a significant part in the replacement of the blowout preventer (BOP) on the Deepwater Horizon well. However, at 9 pm on the 1st, with the waves still a little higher than desired, the activity has yet to start.
One of the new camera feeds that is being displayed is a weight indicator on the deck of the Q4000. This is not yet on line, but Admiral Allen pointed out on Wednesday the loads that will come onto the vessel.
We anticipate removing the blowout preventer with the latching mechanism that will be attached to a drill pipe string that will be suspended from the Q4000. . . . . . .
The combined weight of the drill string, the latching mechanism and the blowout preventer itself is approximately a million pounds. When they released that blowout preventer from the well it will be suspended at about 5000 feet below the surface.
There are two things we’re concerned about when this occurs, number one is the wave height. You can imagine the Q4000 riding up and down on the waves. When they ride up it exerts more dynamic loading on that pipe system. So we’re concerned about the weight and the ability of the pipe system to handle that.
Before the BOP itself is removed, the capping stack has to be taken off. The latching mechanism to attach to that is already down underwater, and is being monitored by the Enterpise, through ROV2. The stack will come off first, and it is that activity which is now expected to start at noon on Thursday.
Once the Q4000 latches onto the original BOP, it is going to raise it up, through the platform of the vessel, and then set it back down on that deck. There are two additional static cameras on the Q4000 which are monitoring the moon pool, and which are presumably going to be carrying all this activity starting Thursday and running perhaps 36 hours, depending on the weather and how easily the BOP assembly breaks away from the well.
As soon as the Q4000 has the BOP on board, it has to move out of the way (and trans-ship the parts of the BOP, once separated to smaller ships to be sent ashore) so that the new BOP can be put in place.
This is the task for Development Driller 2, but before the job is finished the BOP has to be thoroughly tested to ensure that everything is now functional, the BOP will then be ready for the final stages. At this point it will be possible to restart the relief well to complete the bottom kill. That is still not anticipated to start until after Labor Day.
I am going to insert the quote on what the Admiral said on hydrates it its entirety, since I am not sure exactly what his point was.
Hello, Admiral. Can you tell me how the current BOP is attached to the well head and if there’s any concern about hydrates or other (inaudible) that might make it difficult to latch?
Thad Allen: Well, the current BOP is attached to the wellhead with the same connector they would use for any similar drilling well. To the extent that hydrates are there, we don’t expect that to be a problem right now. Had we continued to try and fish and get the pipe out of there, there was some concerns that hydrates would be blocking our ability to use a camera and actually operate down there. So I’m not sure that’s an issue. If there’s an issue at all, it’s probably the issue of the condition of the wellhead itself. When the Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank it bent the riser pipe over and ultimately the riser pipe was severed from the drill rig. At that point, if you can imagine, as massive as the blowout preventer was and that wellhead was, it probably bent over to some extent and then when the riser pipe separated from the rig it popped back up. It did not pop straight back up and there’s been some attempt to level that, to make sure we could get that as close to vertical as we can. I believe the current estimate right now, it is about two degrees off center line. So as we go in to pull the blow out preventer out, I would say hydrates are not a real big concern. I think the alignment to the true vertical about two degrees off would impact somehow to a very small degree the pull on the BOP as you’re trying to free it. We are aware of it. The engineers have taken that into account. We don’t think it will be a prohibiting condition, but it is something we are aware of.
In the other story that I have been watching, that of the miners in Chile, the equipment has started, and the preliminary drilling of the central shaft is now down more that 20 m. At the same time the rescuers are considering ways of reaming one of the smaller drill holes that have already reached the area. This might take a greater number of stages to get the hole out to the required size, but could, in total, be faster than the two-stage operation that is currently in progress. In either case, moving the muck from the bottom of the excavation with wheelbarrows, and ensuring that none of it gets stuck as it falls from the machine, are both concerns that will have to be addressed as the work moves forward.
As we try to figure out how to curb an unhealthy increase in obesity, one of the factors under consideration is the built environment. Those who in live in places where few destinations are within walking/biking distance, public transit is limited, and the environment is unfriendly to pedestrians and cyclists may find it harder to get the recommended amount of physical activity. Studying the built environment's effect on obesity is challenging, though. People who live in pedestrian-friendly areas with good public transit may be more likely to get enough activity and less likely to be obese than their counterparts in car-dependent places, but that doesn't demonstrate causation. What if people who hate physical activity naturally gravitate toward auto-dependent areas, and walkers move to places where it's easy to get around on foot?
This is why I was excited to see a study by researchers from the University of Pennsylvania, Drexel University, and the RAND Corporation that takes advantage of a natural experiment to study causality (via Ryan Avent). It was published in the August 2010 issue of the American Journal of Preventive Medicine, and the full text is available for free online.
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History repeats itself. Boy does it.
This was never more evident than after I finished reading Charles Wohlforth's The Fate of Nature (2010), which has a few ominous chapters dedicated to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Wohlforth was a journalist who covered the spill in the field and after reading his account, I was humbled by the realization that none of my observations of the BP oil spill were orignal. The landscape is almost exactly the same, except for the fact that BP is going to wind up paying less money for a bigger disaster and that photoshop didn't exist yet, so Exxon couldn't tamper photographs of their control room.
Wohlforth's thoughts about the Exxon spill are in blockquotes:
As I spent more time on the sound, in the oil, the press conferences and carnival of activity in Valdez seemed increasingly irrelevant and disconnected from reality. Exxon officials always announced numbers -- miles of boom, numbers of skimmers, million of dollars spent -- facts that, if they meant anything at all, couldn't be checked.
Yep.
When the workers began landing on oiled beaches they were given oil-absorbent rages to wipe off individual rocks."
In the Gulf of Mexico, it's paper towels and saltmarshes.
A man said that taking an Exxon paycheck for doing nothing was his way of punishing the company."
I heard one fisherman in the Vessel of Opportunity program say that the BP oil spill was God's way of redistributing wealth.
Did the cleanup as a whole do more harm than good? The question is unanswerable without defining good. It benefited Exxon and its competitive corporate-government paradigm. Cleaning eliminated most visible evidence of oil. The effort took so long world attention turned to other issues and anger faded. A diminished Prince William Sound became the new baseline for the next generation of people. Today the spill has passed into history and Exxon still rules the world. Good also, perhaps, from the point of view of human users of the beaches, since the cleanup may have hastened the time when they felt safe eating clams, fish, and seals again. Cleaning probably shortened the the time active contamination affected some species. But if good is defined as the total health of the ecosystem, it's probably that much less cleaning would have been better. Oil would have been dispersed anyway, more slowly but without the cleanup's many environmental costs. And more of the visible black asphalt would have remained, biologically inert but a powerful warning about the costs companies like Exxon impose on our shared birthright. Cleaning removed the evidence, but not the damage.
BP has used more than 1.8 million gallons of dispersant.
"...Kindhearted television viewers were instead dealt the ahppy ending of seeing treated animals released, as if cured, rather than images of terminally disabled otters being euthanized. By denying them the truth, the Fish and Wildlife Service compounded the harm of the oil spill."
BP allows a lot of media access, but it's the kind of media they want. At the rehabilitation center, reporters can watch oiled birds getting clean. They can't see them dead (see photo; that's a crime scene and apparently not media worthy).
Exxon sent checks to vessel owners who had volunteered in the clean up. An average boat chartered for $3,000 a day, almost all profit, since expenses were paid separately by Exxon. As the boats stayed out for weeks and month, often with hardly anything to do, life-changing sums of money accumulated; owners of big boats, or of more than one, became spillionaires.
Yep. This is true, too.
Note: the Center for American Progress also has some excellent posts that compare the two oil spills and analyze how Exxon managed to make money and avoid punishment after their spill.
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Iowa is to corn ethanol what Saudi Arabia is to oil. At present Iowa has the capacity to produce 3.5 billion gallons of ethanol per year, which is 26% of the nation’s total (Source). This is of course due to the large amount of corn production in Iowa, enabled by ample rainfall and rich topsoil.
But Iowa differs from Saudi Arabia with respect to energy production in one very important detail: Saudi Arabia satisfies their own energy needs with the oil they produce, and exports the excess. Iowa on the other hand exports the vast majority of the ethanol they produce while importing gasoline as motor fuel.
Gasoline consumption in Iowa is presently around 1.6 billion gallons per year (Source). This is the energy equivalent of 2.4 billion gallons per year of ethanol. Yet amazingly, Iowa does not have an E10 blend mandate (that is, a mandate for a mixture of 90% gasoline and 10% ethanol) that is so common in many other states. Of the 3.5 billion gallons of ethanol Iowa produces each year, only 100 million gallons is consumed in the state (less than 3%!). Perhaps even more amazing is that Iowa — seemingly the best candidate in the U.S. for biofuel self-sufficiency — ranks in the Top 10 consumers of gasoline per capita in the U.S. (Source).
Iowa is a state that by all accounts should be able to satisfy their own liquid fuel needs with ethanol, and still have some left for export. They are perhaps unique in the U.S. in that respect. Instead, petroleum continues to supply over 90% of the motor fuel in Iowa, and virtually all of the fuel used in the farm equipment for growing all of that corn. Something is wrong with this picture.
That is a perplexing question. If ethanol is a real alternative to gasoline, why hasn’t it taken over the marketplace in Iowa? Ethanol should have a greater advantage over gasoline in Iowa than probably in any other state. And in fact, the price spread between gasoline and E85 (the 85% ethanol blend) is consistently higher in Iowa than in other states (Source). The reported price spread in Iowa as of July 2010 was 30.1%, which should be large enough to drive consumers to E85 over gasoline. So what is the problem?
There are three possible problems that I can identify:
1). Perhaps there isn’t enough E85 infrastructure in place.
2). There aren’t enough E85 vehicles on the road;
3). The price is still too high relative to gasoline.
Regarding infrastructure, as of January 2010, there were an estimated 136 service stations in Iowa selling E85 (out of 977 total service stations) and a total of 2,233 Stations selling E85 in the United States (Source). Iowa also has an incentive program in place to install new E85 infrastructure (see below), but with 136 stations across the state (and growing), availability doesn’t seem to be a major limiting factor.
The availability of E85 vehicles may be a more serious impediment. As of 2009, there are reportedly around 8 million vehicles on U.S. roads that are E85 capable (Source). Given a total vehicle population of around 250 million, that means that only around 3% of the cars on the road are E85-capable. (I could not find statistics specific to Iowa). This would seem to be a limiting factor at present for E85 penetration; E85 can’t capture 10% of the market if only 3% of the cars can burn it.
Yet even with some E85 vehicles on the road, sales of E85 in Iowa have been falling and sales of ethanol in general lag the rest of the U.S.:
Final 2009 Iowa Ethanol Sales Figures Show Step Back for State
JOHNSTON, IA – The Iowa Renewable Fuels Association (IRFA) today announced that Iowans chose E10, a 10 percent ethanol and 90 percent gasoline blend, only 73 percent of the time during 2009 according to Iowa Department of Revenue (IDR) figures. According to the Des Moines Register, Iowa ranks 32nd in ethanol sales despite being the leading ethanol producer.
“Iowa’s ethanol sales did not reach the 2009 goal of the Iowa Renewable Fuels Standard,” said Monte Shaw, IRFA Executive Director. “These are figures based on mandatory reporting of taxable gallons to the State of Iowa and the IRS – not an incomplete, voluntary report. Obviously, IRFA members are disappointed in the results. The state has also released E85 sales for the first nine months of 2009. During those three quarters, E85 sales were down 15% compared to 2008.”
The number of E85 vehicles has been slowly rising, so if E85 sales are falling then there is also apparently a cost factor that is coming into play. For much of 2008, the price differential between E85 and gasoline was 15-20% (historical pricing available at E85prices.com). For the first half of 2009, that price differential had fallen to only 10%. Clearly, if E85 is ever to become the dominant fuel in Iowa, the price differential will have to properly reflect the fuel economy difference of E85 versus gasoline. E85 contains about 25% less energy than gasoline on a volumetric basis. Owners that experience a 25% reduction in fuel economy will expect to pay 25% less for their fuel. In fact, they may expect to pay 30% less due to having to refuel more often.
But, a real game-changer could be ethanol-optimized engines such as that touted by Detroit-based automotive engineering firm Ricardo. While their engine is projected to cost more, they project that they will deliver fuel economy from E85 that is comparable to what can be achieved with gasoline. (I reported on this concept in some detail in All BTUs Are Not Created Equally). In that case, consumers may be willing to buy E85 at a lower differential. The caveats here are that the engine is still in the lab, and the higher engine cost will determine the E85 differential that consumers will expect.
Before making recommendations, it is important to clearly set out the objective. As I have said numerous times, corn ethanol may not be a sustainable solution that is broadly applicable across the U.S. However, I do believe that it could be a very good solution in specific regions. Ethanol made from irrigated corn and shipped to California is in an entirely different sustainability category than ethanol produced and used locally in Iowa. In fact, despite my reputation as an enemy of ethanol from people who are careless with their interpretations, I have used Iowa for years as an example of what sustainable corn ethanol could look like. I have long believed that Iowa is in a good position to lead the way forward.
So from my perspective, the objective would be to increase the sustainability of ethanol — starting in Iowa — by increasing local consumption. This would decrease U.S. dependence on foreign oil more than if we have to transport oil from the coasts inland to Iowa while transporting ethanol from Iowa to the coasts.
Pump infrastructure in Iowa does not appear to be the limiting factor. Plus, Iowa already has good incentives in place that support rolling out additional E85 pumps (See Current E85 Incentives below). Iowa also already has a tax credit in place that is specifically directed at E85 sales (which is on top of the national ethanol tax credit). Ultimately, additional incentives may be required, as evidenced by falling E85 sales in the past year. Incentives could be in the form of direct E85 tax credits or fuel tax reductions or waivers. But the real issue seems to be lack of E85 vehicles.
According to automakers, the vehicles are on the way:
US automakers on track for more ethanol vehicles
U.S. automakers also expect to meet a goal of making half their vehicle production flex-fuel by 2012, up from around 30 percent now. But they warn that they could pull back if there aren’t enough gas stations with ethanol pumps.
On the other hand comes news that people may not be interested in buying them:
Flex fuel vehicles may be on the way out
When it comes to buying cars, Americans are still using the price of the vehicle as the primary deciding factor. A well-priced, fuel-efficient vehicle is the car of choice for Americans and this is bad news for the flex fuel vehicle industry. In a survey conducted by Harris Interactive, only 5 percent of respondents said they would be extremely likely to purchase a flex fuel vehicle, even if it only added $250 to the base price of the vehicle.
So it would appear that consumers may need some convincing before they are ready to take the plunge on an E85 vehicle. There are several ways to incentivize sales of E85 vehicles. The worst is probably just to mandate that vehicles sold in the state of Iowa are E85-compatible. (I think this is the worst because mandates often have unintended consequences; hence I prefer incentives over mandates). Probably the most manageable would be rebates or expanded tax credits — at the state or federal level — for the purchase of an E85 vehicle. Instead of a Cash for Clunkers program (which I was not a fan of), we would have been better served to have a cash for E85 vehicles program.
Such a program should probably be driven from within Iowa. After all, they arguably stand to benefit from using the ethanol they produce and moving toward true energy independence. Transportation costs cited in the recent DOE study on the proposed ethanol pipeline (that I discussed here) suggested that railing ethanol costs $0.19/gallon (shipping via pipeline was cited at $0.28/gal). Imagine that only half of the ethanol produced in Iowa is used in Iowa; there is a potential shipping savings of over $330 million per year. (However, under the present system these costs are passed through to consumers out of state, so it might be hard for Iowa to justify a program on the basis of savings for Iowans).
Beyond personal transportation, corn growers should be pushing for tractors that can run off of ethanol. They can be built. In 2006 the Saskatchewan Research Council unveiled a tractor modified to operate on 100 per cent hydrated ethanol. More on that development here:
From late December 2006 to late January 2007, the 120 horsepower ethanol-fuelled tractor clocked 60 hours of running time and got fuel mileage of 24 litres per hour. It takes about 15 bushels of wheat to create one tank of hydrated ethanol for the tractor, says Rueve, explaining that the fuel consists of 94 per cent alcohol and 6 per cent water.
As farm input costs increase, both the tractor and the truck are examples of developments that may make farm operations more sustainable in the future. Meanwhile, biofuels in general offer one option for those who are looking for ways to revitalize the rural economy.
So often we hear about how ethanol is providing homegrown fuel for automobiles, and yet the tractors that produce the homegrown corn run off of petroleum. I think it would be in the best interest of Iowa and of the country as a whole (given Iowa’s importance as a food producer) to break the petroleum dependence of Iowa’s farms by building tractors that can run off of ethanol (or biodiesel).
Iowa could be self-sufficient with their ethanol production if certain policies are supported. Some policies are already in place that are meant to address E85 availability and cost. However, the availability of E85 vehicles and the willingness of consumers to buy them is probably the key limiting factor. Ultimately, building up an E85 market in Iowa and eventually in the rest of the Midwest could solve a number of issues for the ethanol industry. If the Midwest adopted E85 as its flagship fuel, there would be no blend wall to be concerned about, nor would an expensive ethanol pipeline be needed to export ethanol out of the region. The potential market across the Midwest is triple the nation’s current ethanol production, giving ethanol producers an ample opportunity to grow without forcing national mandates that put E15 into cars that aren’t designed for it.
Iowa has tax credits in place specific to E85 sales:
E85 Retailer Tax Credit
A tax credit is available to retail stations dispensing E85 for use in motor vehicles in the amount of $0.20 per gallon for calendar year 2010, and $0.10 per gallon in calendar year 2011. After 2011, the tax credit decreases by $0.01 each year and expires after December 31, 2020. Taxpayers claiming the E85 tax credit may also claim the tax credit available for retail ethanol blends for the same gallon of fuel and tax year. (Reference Iowa Code 422.11O)
And toward blending infrastructure:
Biofuels Infrastructure Grants
The Renewable Fuel Infrastructure Program provides financial assistance to E85 and biodiesel retailers. Cost-share grants are available for up to 70% of the total cost of the project, or $50,000, whichever is less, to upgrade or install new E85 or biodiesel infrastructure. Applicants may also qualify for supplemental incentives for up to 75% of the cost of making the improvement, or $30,000, whichever is less, to upgrade or replace an E85 fueling dispenser that has not been approved by an independent testing laboratory. The supplemental incentive is available only to applicants who made the improvement no later than 60 days after the date of the publication in the Iowa administrative bulletin of the state fire marshal’s order providing that a commercially available fueling dispenser is listed as compatible for use with E85 by an independent testing laboratory.
Biodiesel distributors may apply for a cost-share grant for infrastructure upgrades and installations at biodiesel terminal facilities. Facilities blending or dispensing blends ranging from B2 to B98 are eligible for up to 50% of the total project, or $50,000, whichever is less. Facilities blending or dispensing B99 or B100 are eligible for up to 50% of the total project, or $100,000, whichever is less. The Renewable Fuels Infrastructure Board was established under the guidance of the Iowa Department of Economic Development; this 11-member board has authority to determine the eligibility of applicants. (Reference Iowa Code 15G.202-15G.204)
This thread is being closed. Please comment on http://www.theoildrum.com/node/6911.
Additional work near the Deepwater Horizon well site continues to be delayed by high waves. Once the current weather pattern clears, work can commence again.
We understand that today, Wednesday, BP is expect to submit a new report evaluating lessons learned in its response to the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico to U.S. regulator the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement. According to BP, "This report focuses in particular upon the key equipment, facilities and planning tools that were successfully deployed in responding to the spill." There will be another report released by BP later this month, which will examine the causes of the explosion.
Some new devices that we have not commented on are the new Wave Gliders that will monitor water quality. BP is deploying these in the Gulf of Mexico, near the Macondo well site. According to an August 25th press release:
As part of its long term monitoring and research program in the Gulf of Mexico, BP is deploying a new technology that will enable nearly constant monitoring by two satellite-controlled, unmanned vehicles.
The vehicles, known as Wave Gliders and developed by Liquid Robotics in Silicon Valley, California, get their propulsion power from wave action and use solar power for their electronics. They will be deployed beginning today and begin a months-long, ongoing research program in the Gulf of Mexico.
According to the press release, the types of monitoring performed will include
The first step in using the devices will be calibrating the optical sensors, according to Roger Hine, president and CEO of Liquid Robotics. "We look forward to working with BP on this extended research program."
There is also a Wave Glider Fact Sheet available. It indicates
Typically robotic systems have been challenged by limited battery power. The Wave Glider innovatively overcomes this challenge. It uses no fuel, has no motor, and no propeller - but it can swim in any direction at speeds up to two knots - for as long as necessary. It uses a unique, patented, system for converting even the tiniest amount of wave motion into thrust, in any direction. It uses solar panels to power electronics, and houses a sophisticated set of sensors, satellite communications, and microprocessors.
According to the fact sheet, the technology was invented, originally, to listen to humpback whale song. The Wave Glider fleet has been at sea for a combined total of 11.5 years and has covered over 100,000 miles.
Big news from Eruptions (and me.)
Eruptions has always been an evolving space - it started as a little side project on Wordpress that has grown over the last two-and-a-half years into a community of volcano enthusiasts. The blog has drawn over 2.5 million views and 1.5 million visits since I started it in May of 2008 - which, to me, is mindblowing - and I thank of all your for that. I also thank ScienceBlogs for helping more people find the blog over the last 18 months that I've been lucky to be hosted here.
However, with all things, change is sometimes needed. I'm not going to go into the details of my decision, but starting TODAY (September 1), Eruptions is moving to a new home -
http://www.bigthink.com/blogs/eruptions/
RSS: feed://bigthink.com/blogs/eruptions.rss
Update all your bookmarks and feeds!
This wasn't an easy decision for me, but hopefully all of you will see that it is the right decision for Eruptions - so please join me over at the new site.
And remember, you can follow Eruptions on Twitter as well - @eruptionsblog - to keep up with all the volcano news.
Thanks again to ScienceBlogs ... and here's to the future!
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Earlier this year (in June), Channel 4 television here in the UK broadcast series 2 of Inside Nature's Giants (ING from hereon... titled Raw Anatomy in the US, you poor, poor people). You may have heard it here first. Hopefully you're familiar with ING series 1 - it looked at the anatomy of elephants, baleen whales, crocodiles and giraffes - and, if you're not, be sure to check out the Tet Zoo articles starting here. My praise for series 1 was extreme, by which I mean that I thought it was excellent: a real triumph and a major event in both the world of broadcasting, and in bringing good science to the masses.
I'm pleased to say that this was widely recognised: many TV critics said positive things about ING (very memorable example), and in June 2010 the team behind the series (Windfall Films) won a BAFTA award (= British Academy of Film and Television Arts). Nature featured an interview with anatomist Joy Reidenberg - the main [human] star of the series - in June (Gilbey 2010). The interview touched on the educational significance of the series, the importance of bringing evolutionary perspectives on nature to a wide audience, and the fact that anatomy is not a dead, Victorian science (far from it: we are in the midst of an anatomical revolution). Clearly, expectations for series 2 were pretty high.
WARNING: major spoiler for ep 1 ahead, and further spoilers to follow.
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New Solutions: The Drawing Board is a monthly feature produced by the journal New Solutions. Read more about it here.
By Anne Fischel and Lin Nelson
We write to you as teachers and researchers concerned about the environmental and occupational health hazards impacting communities living and working in mining sites across North America and the world.
Through our project, "No Borders: Communities Living and Working with Asarco," we have spent the last 5 years looking at those affected by and affecting the work of the Asarco corporation, one of the oldest and largest mining, smelting and refining companies in the U.S. While our work is based at the Evergreen State College, we are committed to reaching beyond academia and working with communities who face industrial pollution and irresponsible corporations.
As part of our project, we recently had the opportunity to join a labor solidarity group in order to visit striking miners and their families in Cananea, Mexico, 60 miles south of Tucson. Our aim was to obtain first-hand information about the three-year action against mine operator Grupo Mexico, as well as to lend support to an emerging solidarity effort.
Right, the previous thread has spilled off a discussion of Jastrow, Nierenberg and Seitz and their representation of a Hansen et al. figure. I have the feeling that the JNS paper may have appeared in multiple places, but the one I have access to is:
There is a lot wrong with that abstract (culminating in the once-traditional but now discarded over-reliance on the S+C satllite record) but the bit that is of immeadiate interest (because it figures in the previous discussion) is their take on figure 5 from Hansen et al. Which is:
And which they "reproduce" as:
The "2" after "Hansen et al." is a ref to the 1981 Science paper, so we really are talking about the same thing. They don't say which figure, but it has to be fig. 5 (but see-also below the fold).
So, is their reproduction fair?
[Update, and post pulled to top (original publication date 2010/08/26) to show it: I've now discovered something vaguely interesting, in reading the "original" Nierenberg report, chapter 5 (which I never got to in my "book club" series). That is, their fig 5.8. Which is - ta da - the Hansen 1980 figure, panel (a) only: ie, just the CO2. But it is a faithful reproduction of the original - same obs, same start and end times, and the model line isn't shifted downwards. So my guess would be that JNS got their fig from the Nierenberg report, rather than going back to the original. That doesn't excuse them, of course. But it interesting that fig 5 of the Nierenberg report makes similar claims to JNS: it notes that the figure doesn't match the temperature record very well (der, of course it doesn't), and it fails to note, in that section, the other panels of the Hansen figure. So, who wrote chapter 5? Gunter Weller, James Baker, W Lawrence Gates, Michael MacCraken, Syukuro Manabe, Thomas Vonder Haar. I don't know all of them, but at the very least Manabe and MacCracken cannot possibly be called "skeptics". So how did that figure and discussion got into a chapter with their names on? Aha, because that section is about CO2 asa causal factor. They go on to reproduce the other panels of Hansen's figure, including the combination-of-all-factors panel. So chapter 5 is OK; but JNS isn't.
Also: I knew I'd seen and discussed this fig before: and the answer turns out to be Chez Eli - where else? But it was nearly 2 years ago.]
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Dr. Adam Brandt of Stanford University's Department of Energy Resources Engineering sent us a copy of a paper he wrote called Review of mathematical models of future oil supply: Historical overview and synthesizing critique. There seem to be quite a few things of interest, so I have summarized the paper, since the author did not have the time to do this. The box quotes are from the paper.
This paper has two goals. First, it provides a systematic review of oil depletion models produced to date. This serves to make obscure past works (often difficult to find) available to a wider audience so as to limit repetition of past efforts. Second, this paper provides synthesizing critique of previous modeling efforts, with the aim of improving future oil depletion modeling.
A major conclusion of the study is that existing models fare poorly at prediction:
Models based on quite disparate assumptions (e.g., physical simulation vs. economic optimal depletion) have produced approximately bell-shaped production profiles, but data do not support assertions that any one model type is most useful for forecasting future oil production. In fact, evidence suggests that existing models have fared poorly in predicting global oil production. The greatest promise for future developments in oil depletion modeling lies in simulation models that combine both physical and economic aspects of oil production.
Brandt describes four kinds of oil depletion models:
1. Curve Fitting Models
Curve-fitting models of oil production have been used since the 1950s. A variety of models exist, but their general approach is as follows.
1. Define a mathematical function to statistically fit to historical production data.
2. Include constraints to improve the quality of model fit.
3. Fit the constrained model to historical data to project future production.Curve-fitting models vary in the function used, in the use of ultimately recoverable resources (URR) as a constraint and in the usage (or not) of symmetric model functions.
The paper provides descriptions of various curve fitting models, including Hubbert's logistic model.
2. System simulations.
Simulation models (in our classification scheme) differ from curve-fitting models as follows: simulation models explicitly represent underlying physical and/or economic mechanisms that govern oil discovery and extraction, letting the shape of the production profile emerge from these mechanisms rather than specifying it in advance. These models include a broader range of independent variables, addressing a key problem of curve-fitting models noted by Taylor [38]: “No cause-and-effect relationship exists between time and the exploitation of crude oil.”
Thus, with the simulation models, one does not need to assume that the oil will be pumped out as quickly as possible. Oil production can follow demand, or some other approach. Brandt comments that a major difficulty of complex simulation models is the numerous input data that are required to parameterize the functional relationships. Figures 3 and 4 give an example of parts of a simulation model.
3. Bottom-up models
Bottom-up models use detailed field- or project-level data to “build up” projections of production from larger regions (such as a nation or the world). Bottom-up modeling has become increasingly prominent as discoveries have slowed and an increasing fraction of future oil is expected to come from already-discovered fields [52].
The most widely published bottom-up model is that of Campbell and co-authors, produced since the mid-1990s [53-55] using national-level models of production to generate global predictions. . .
Skrebowski has produced a bottom up model [58e61], using a database of oil field “megaprojects” e oil field development projects above a threshold size. Because large projects provide the majority of new oil output, this approach provides insight into short-term capacity increases.
4. Economic models of Oil Depletion
The major subcategories of these are
1. Economic optimal depletion theory, such as studied by Hotelling.
2. Economietic models of oil depletion, such as developed by Fisher and later by Kauffman and Cleveland.
1. Curve Fitting Models
Unfortunately, curve-fitting models are often used to make overly specific predictions of future production, ignoring many of the difficulties with such an approach.
An example is given by the excessive importance placed by some analysts on the supposed novelty and accuracy of Hubbert’s 1956 prediction. First, Hubbert’s prediction was predated by at least four publications that provided bell-shaped graphs of future U.S. oil production [13,14,81,82], and no fewer than 7 estimates from the 1950s predicted a peak in US oil production between 1963 and 1973, the approximate range of Hubbert’s low-high predictions (see Table 1). Second, Hubbert’s prediction of a peak in 1970 was based on his high value of URR, which he considered unlikely to be ach- ieved (and which itself was an underestimate). Interpretations of these facts vary: one could argue that Hubbert’s method was not extraordinary, as other methods also came close to predicting the peak date. . .
Another often neglected fact is that all of these studies of the 1950s underestimated URR, some significantly so, despite their reasonably correct projections of the peak date (see Table 1). Cumulative US production has already exceeded 200 Gbbl and significant reserves still remain. Thus, production has not dropped as quickly as Hubbert (or the other authors above) thought that it would, and the US curve is asymmetric [83].
Major issues Brandt raises about curve fitting models include
a. Using exogenous estimates of URR to constrain curve-fitting models is problematic because estimates of URR have been too low in the past.
b. The use of logistic or bell-shaped functions is difficult to support with rigorous scientific reasoning.
c. Production profiles are often asymmetric, with slower rates of decline than rates of increase.
d. Curve fitting models do not account for economic factors, such as demand or resource substitution.
2. Simulation Models
a. Authors often make huge assumptions about the assumed functions and the parameters of the model.
b. Models are often unstable and finely balanced between positive and negative feedbacks. They may omit the role of inertia.
c. While models may fit past data well, they often have poor predictive powers.
3. Bottom's up models
a. If a person builds a model from a magaprojects data base, or similar data base, the person needs more, rather than fewer assumptions about the process--peak production, decline rate, use of enhanced oil recovery
b. It is difficult to model projects not included, like infill drilling, workovers, and use of enhanced oil recovery.
c. The results are generally not reproducible; there is much reliance on the modeler's judgment.
4. Economic Models
So far, they have been kept simple, but their predictive value has been low. They need to include political factors, but it is unclear how to include them.
Existing models have fared poorly in predicting global oil production. Even for models that are commonly thought to be successful, after-the-fact interpretation of the success or failure of a predictive effort is not easy (recall the discussion above of Hubbert’s successful prediction). . .
This author’s judgment with respect to the predictive value of models is as follows (noting that these topics are the source of much current debate):
1. Simple curve-fitting models can provide a first-order understanding of future production, assuming a given level of URR and no significant shocks to the system (e.g., demand continues to grow at rates within historical ranges). Such models are likely sufficient to predict the decade of peak production for an estimate of URR. The mathematical logic here is that consumption is so high during the years of peak production that minor variations in URR, or minor deviations due to political or economic factors, will not serve to significantly affect the date of the peak [111]. Unfortunately, such a conclusion is often of little practical use: major disruptions (e.g., the oil crises of the 1974 and 1979), or major errors in URR estimates have occurred in the past, and could occur again.
2. More-detailed mechanistic models (e.g., bottom-up, econometric), exhibit greater fidelity in reproducing historical data and are therefore likely more useful for near term predictions. But this advantage likely wanes for long-term forecasts because they are no less “brittle” with respect to uncertainties than other model types.
3. The most promising avenue for increasing our understanding of oil production lies in integrating the economic and physical factors of oil production.
4. There is no scientific justification for making specific predictions (e.g., the year of peak production) with any of the surveyed mathematical models: the uncertainties involved make such predictions of little use. Efforts should move away from making these kinds of predictions, and toward understanding the impacts of the inevitable transition to oil substitutes.
It is no longer justifiable to build oil depletion models that neglect the reality of economic substitution with alternative resources like oil sands or coal-based liquid fuels. Nor should economic models neglect the underlying physical, geological, and engineering considerations that fundamentally drive the economics of oil production. Future progress will require building integrated models that account for both the economic and physical realities of oil production.
Global warming skeptics, tobacco industry, CFC defenders actually the same people.
by Tim Varga
I just finished reading Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway’s exhaustively researched new book, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, and must recommend this work to anybody interested in how science is communicated and debated in the public sphere.
Oreskes and Conway are science historians, at UC-San Diego and NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, respectively, and the picture they paint is of a concerted and disturbing effort by a very small cadre of politically conservative - and highly influential - scientists to distort the public perception about complicated scientific issues.
The basic story goes like this: in the 1950’s, evidence for a link between tobacco smoking and cancer emerged, both in the labs of the tobacco industry and independent researchers. Fearing that this evidence would result in a general belief that smoking was hazardous, and that this belief would reduce cigarette sales, the tobacco industry began a purposeful and now-famous campaign to deceive the public by distorting the scientific consensus around the tobacco-cancer link. The goal of the misinformation campaign was to manufacture doubt and controversy about the underlying science linking smoking with cancer. By creating the facade of a debate, the industry hoped the public would conclude that the science was uncertain, and therefore not ready for regulatory or even personal action.
Perhaps the parallels to other environmental problems are already clear to you. The book goes on to detail how the same strategy has been used - often by the very same people - to delay action on the ozone hole, acid rain, and global warming.
The scary truth behind all of these issues is that science is by its very nature always unsettled. There are always more questions to ask, more details and hypotheses to explore, more (and sometimes conflicting) evidence to uncover. Smoking isn’t the only thing in the world that causes cancer of course, nor is carbon dioxide the only gas that warms our planet - but the body of evidence leads to the conclusion that smoking significantly increases the chances of getting cancer, and human-caused emissions of carbon dioxide are dangerously increasing the temperature of the earth.
Skeptics routinely use this inherent feature of scientific discovery to downplay the large and growing consensus supporting causal links between human actions and environmental or global consequences. In other words, they proclaim the science incomplete and political and personal action necessarily premature. This is a sad twisting of scientific inquiry; the process itself assumes that there is always more to discover. However, the search for absolute truth does not mean that we cannot reach well supported conclusions along the way.
Scientists, though, do not make public policy in this world. In our country, legislators are democratically elected to fill that role, presumably because an informed citizenry considers a certain individual or group most capable of fulfilling their wishes. We place high regard - and, at least at one time, high esteem - on the role of a free press to inform our citizenry, going so far as to enshrine that right in the Constitution. The press, however, ostensibly works under a model of fairness and “equal time” - concepts that apply to a two-party democracy, but are not so applicable to science. Allowing a global warming skeptic equal time on a news page alongside a much larger community of scientists who believe that humans are causing climate change may seem balanced, but the truth is that this already favors the minority, as their views have been largely discredited in the academic literature (where scientific inquiries are hashed out). Indeed, it is often a mark of the erroneous camp that its hypotheses are put forth in the media, rather than in scientific journals.
We require more critical thinking in our lives, not less. Journalists are tasked with reporting what is true, and that should reflect expert opinion without false or inappropriate claims to equal time. Scientists must consider whether their results are being accurately portrayed outside the ivory tower, and work to ensure that their understanding of phenomena are translated and displayed to everybody.
And citizens? Us? We must work to analyze the expertise of people we read, watch, and listen to every day. Nobody is an expert in every arena, and we must trust experienced information sources to give us sound advice. But that trust cannot be blind; we must work to analyze the sources of the information we use to make decisions.
In the end, all societal relationships are built on trust - it’s vitally important that we examine the credentials of people we rely upon, especially when it comes to complex environmental problems.
Ranchers not happy about wolf reintroduction, regardless of compensation.
by Tim Varga
It turns out that even though ranchers and farmers get paid for any livestock killed by reintroduced wolves, that cash doesn’t change negative opinions about wolves one bit.
Retributional compensation is supposed to help. Whether local governments, voluntary insurance cooperatives, or NGOs provide the financial support, the idea is that livestock losses caused by reintroduced predator species could be mitigated by financial compensation for that loss.
The results of a new study(subs. required) measuring attitudes towards conservation are not encouraging. In neither Wisconsin nor India - two very different places with different relationships to protected and reintroduced predators - did payments alter negative perceptions of those predators. Notably, not even the amount paid was relevant, as more generous payments in Wisconsin (controlled for Purchasing Power Parity) did not result in greater acceptance of conservation goals.
It’s not so surprising, I suppose: wolves represent a threat to livestock populations, where once in the not so distant past they were no threat at all (because they were exterminated). Interestingly, there are often as many or more livestock losses due to non-wolf predators: black bears, coyotes, and feral dogs are all responsible for livestock deaths every year. Yet the protection afforded by their unique status creates the impression that wolves are not a product of a wild and untamed wilderness that abuts your local ranch, but an affliction enforced by outsiders at the expense of rural populations. In other words, people are upset at wolf depredation because wolves are protected by people, yet other predators are considered a natural part of the landscape because no one exterminated them 100 years ago.
The study’s results call into question the utility of compensation payments for conservation goals: it appears they don’t encourage people to care. It’s an imperfect analogy, but it makes me wonder whether tax-shifts or rebates from carbon legislation or regulation will work. Sure, an equivalent amount of money may be returned to individuals in the form of tax breaks (lower income taxes, say), but if gasoline always costs more at the pump, will people still dislike carbon taxes? It’s been my assumption that performing a tax shift or providing rebates under a cap-and-trade system would lead to wider acceptance with the underlying goal of carbon reductions. The evidence presented in this new paper suggests that compensation for conservation goals may not positively affect opinions about those goals, so that money may be better used in some other way.
E-bike addition could transform traditional bikes.
by Tim Varga
Looks like the Copenhagen Wheel Adam was so gaga about has topped the list of US regional entries, and will compete against 17 other inventions from around the world for the James Dyson Award of design.
The winner will be announced on August 24, but in the meantime, we can all enjoy the snappy marketing video above. At a retail price of $600, the Copenhagen Wheel may be priced low enough to make a big splash. MIT’s Senseable City Lab (the wheel’s designers) says to look for the wheel in stores by June 2011.
Petitioners misrepresent the science, but EPA knows what it's talking about.
by Tim Varga
The EPA recently responded to 10 petitions challenging the historic Endangerment Finding that linked increases in the concentration of atmospheric greenhouse gases with a decline in human welfare.
The petitioners challenging the Finding - mostly conservative groups including the Ohio Coal Association, the Southeastern Legal Foundation and the State of Texas - argued that the EPA should reconsider based on new evidence found in the CRU emails (aka Climategate), which supposedly call into question the entire scientific basis of climate change.
The EPA’s response(pdf):
None of the issues raised by petitioners pertaining to new science or data that EPA allegedly did not address changes or undermines the scientific basis for EPAs Findings. In many cases, the issues raised by the petitioners are not new, but were [in] fact raised and addressed during the rule-making. Petitioners have misinterpreted or misrepresented the meaning and significance of the scientific literature, findings, and data they cite, made claims that are not supported by the evidence they rely on, provided incomplete and biased analyses to support their claims, failed to acknowledge or account for important results, and, at times, ignored EPAs endangerment record.
I’m glad the EPA is mandated to respond to these challenges - even though we’re paying for it with our tax dollars. This response presents crucial information to have when talking about the current state of climate science, the evidence for anthropogenic global warming, and the policy actions we need to take to mitigate the effects of climate change. There are many things we have yet to learn and understand about our planet, but we already have firm knowledge that human-derived greenhouse gases are heating up our atmosphere to levels that endanger human welfare and much of the biotic system on which we rely.
The Konkan coast of Maharashtra, India – dubbed the California of India – has been the stage for an impressive people’s movement bent on opposing a slew of coal-fired power projects and mines. These developments will ravage one of Maharashtra’s most serene areas, home to an international biodiversity hotspot as well as world famous Alphonso mango. Despite its idyllic setting, Konkan locals have proven themselves to be street-smart activists capable of striking back at those who threaten their way of life.
In the 90s, Konkan’s grassroots movement opposed big projects from Sterlite ...
The NRDC caught up with Actor Ryan Reynolds in New Orleans last week and produced the video below. It covers Ryan's thoughts on the current situation in New Orleans in the wake of the gulf oil spill.
He also contributed as a guest blogger on the NRDC site onearth, stating:
You don't have to make a personal trip to the Gulf of Mexico to realize the BP disaster has blown the cover off a subject some would prefer to keep quiet: the ongoing damage inflicted by our addiction to oil.
When you see images of blackened beaches, grounded ...
You probably check your utility bill monthly to find out how much your television, toaster, computer and refrigerator are costing you to run.
The question you should also be asking yourself is: how much does my energy cost in terms of the natural world? Because thermoelectric power plants, be they nuclear, coal, natural gas, or oil, create varying amounts of pollution, and use vast quantities of water. In fact, almost 40 percent of freshwater withdrawals in the U.S. are the result of power generation.
Thermoelectric power plants are those plants which burn a fuel to create steam to drive ...
At first, I wasn’t going to blog on this because I thought it must be a hoax. Who could possibly ask such a question of candidates? Then again, the Tea Party have outsourced their thinking on climate to The Viscount Monckton of Brenchley, which is as ridiculous as it gets.
Yesterday, the UK Guardian’s Leo ...
This month, BlackGold Biofuels, a Philadelphia-based company, turned an 800-pound butter sculpture into diesel fuel. It was part of an experiment led by Michael J. Haas, a research biochemist at the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). The sculpture, shaped like Benjamin Franklin and the Liberty Bell, was made for the Pennsylvania Farm Show.
BlackGold doesn't usually work with rancid butter; the company specializes in turning fats, oils, and grease--known in the cooking industry as FOG--into biofuel. FOG, also called brown grease, is more commonly comprised of used cooking oils or sewer grease. Brown grease is typically disposed at ...
In what could be a breakthrough experiment paving the way for capturing electricity out of thin air one day, a team of Brazilian scientists have shown that water droplets in the atmosphere pick up a charge and do not remain neutral, as was earlier believed.
Popsci reports on the experiment:
Using small particles of aluminum phosphate and silica — two particles found commonly in the atmosphere — they showed that in the presence of water vapor silica particles become more negatively charged. Aluminum phosphate grows slightly more positively charged. This building of charges in humid air can accumulate and be transferred to ...
Oil industry geologists have hardly been noted for their readiness to accept the findings of climate science. The American Association of Petroleum Geologists, a large international organisation of 31,000 members, is non-committal in its 2007 statement, though that was admittedly an advance on their previous rejection of anthropogenic warming.
Bryan Lovell has worked as a BP geologist as well as an academic, but the title of his book is enough to indicate that non-committal is not for him: Challenged by Carbon: The Oil Industry and Climate Change.
In his acceptance of the case for anthropogenic global warming Lovell lays ...
In August, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) announced an agreement with global chemical manufacturer Bayer CropScience to end the use of the pesticide aldicarb in the United States.
The EPA’s press release notes that the pesticide “no longer meets rigorous U.S. food safety standards”, and may pose unnecessary dietary risks, especially to infants and children if treated food is not washed properly prior to consumption.
The first crops to be aldicarb-free will be citrus and potatoes. Bayer will also adopt risk mitigation strategies to prevent aldicarb from entering groundwater. Finally, Bayer will voluntarily stop making aldicarb ...
New Zealand based LanzaTech recently announced that they have successfully produced a
necessary component to create polymers, plastics, and fuels from their unique fermentation process. For those unfamiliar with LanzaTech, it is a company looking to utilize industrial waste gases and waste products like trash to produce biofuels, particularly ethanol. In the process, they combine both the waste gases and waste products in a fermentation unit where proprietary microbes use these materials to create the fuel.
LanzaTech’s process differs from other ethanol production processes including the corn ethanol production process that many are familiar. Whereas corn ethanol is based ...
While Western governments from the U.S. to the UK debate the validity of “peak oil”, and obfuscate the probability under a cloak of secrecy, the working world wrings its hands, wondering what will happen when the day arrives and the energy needed to fuel industry – the lifeblood of national economies – is no longer available.
Peak oil, as first proposed by geophysicist Dr. M. King Hubbert, describes the moment when global oil extraction reaches a maximum and begins to gradually decline, setting up a scenario where each barrel of oil is increasingly valuable, and where difficult-to-extract reserves (like tar sands ...
I’ve been thinking about writing a post along these lines, when someone far more knowledgeable on the subject beat me to the punch.
Here is a Grist post by Robert J. Walker, the former president of Handgun Control, Inc. (now the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence), who “helped to lead the fight for passage of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993 and the 1994 federal assault-weapons ban”:
[Italics are mine. Bold in original.]
Supporters of climate-change legislation have much to learn from an organization that is often rated as the most powerful lobby in Washington: the ...
The world’s oldest plant and seed bank, Pavlovsk Experimental Station, is facing the axe (or, more properly, the bulldozer) as Russian developers, under the guise of the Russian Housing Development Foundation, prepare to raze the site to build houses.
The story, from the outskirts of St. Petersburg, on the eastern fringe of the Baltic Sea, sounds surprisingly American. The threat, however, is global. Pavlovsk Bank, as it’s known locally, is one of only two botanical repositories (plant/seed banks) on the planet (the other being Svalbard). At Pavlovsk, 70 hectares (approximately 173 acres) support 5,500 different varieties ...
Courtesy of Sierra Club India Environment: India, like many rapidly industrializing nations, views development in large part through the prism of Western experience. As a result, it has become nearly axiomatic that as economic development progresses and a prosperous middle class emerges, consumption for a range of consumer goods increases. Of these, arguably none are more preeminently American than the automobile.
Much hype has surrounded India pursuing an American style development trajectory with the release of an affordable car for the masses - Tata’s Nano. The implications of which have lead to a predictably similar automobile, oil, security complex. India ...
"No matter how dark things seem to be or actually are, raise your sights and see possibilities - always see them for they're always there." -- Norman Vincent Peale
Hurricane Katrina slammed into New Orleans five years ago flooding 80% of the city, destroying homes, stores, schools, churches, and lives. When the levees broke the Lower Nine, one of the poorest areas of the city, found itself under 15 feet of water. The predominately African American community was almost wiped off the map. Even today only one fifth of the original residents have returned and the infrastructure is almost non-existent.
Maybe ...
In a recent piece that received attention from all kinds of media outlets, Matthew Brown of the AP reported that in the U.S., there is a major boom in the construction of new coal-fired power plants. According to Brown, 16 large coal-fired power plants have gone online since 2008 and another 16 more are under construction. And in 2009 alone, eight plants generating a total of 3,218 megawatts became operational, the largest in a single year since 1991, according to figures from the National Energy Technology Laboratory (pdf).
While the new wave of plants do have technological advancements ...
Remember dumping – the rich country farm subsidies that allow them to dump their products in poor countries at artificially cheap prices, thereby wiping out local agriculture? Tim Wise on the Triple Crisis blog has been running the numbers on the impact of NAFTA (US-Canada-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, in force since 1994).
He calls it a the ‘controlled experiment’ “because NAFTA liberalized agricultural trade dramatically over a short period of time, Mexico imports most basic grains and meats almost exclusively from the United States, and Mexican farmers grow many of the crops that compete with the imports. In such a case ...
Utilities feel pressure from more users and less water.
Water constraints are making old operational practices in the energy sector no longer possible. Three-fourths of the electricity generated in the United States is thermally-driven, according to the Government Accountability Office, an arm of Congress that investigates federal spending. Burning fuel to drive a turbine creates excess heat that must be removed for the plant to function. Because water has been historically cheap and abundant, most plants use it as a coolant.
As the number of users and uses rises, better management becomes increasingly important.
“Our existing water management practices and ...
Why climate science divides people along political lines.
It was Australia’s second climate change election. Climate change deposed the former leaders of both main parties: Kevin Rudd (Labor) because his position was too weak, Malcolm Turnbull (Liberals) because his position was too strong. When Julia Gillard, the new Labor leader, also flunked the issue, many of her supporters defected to the Greens.
Labor’s collapse began when the senate rejected Rudd’s emissions trading scheme. Faced with a choice between dissolving parliament and calling an election or dropping the scheme, he chickened out and lost the confidence of the ...
Last June I reported on changing levels of acidity in the Chesapeake Bay and its affects on the shells of young oysters, making them thinner than usual thus making them more available to predators such as crabs.
Now a study been published in the Journal of Biogeography indicating that climate change is raising water and air temperatures along the U.S. east coast and shrinking the region where blue mussels, or mytilus edulis, are able to survive. Blue oysters, known for their sweet flavor, used to be found as far south as Cape Hatteras, North Carolina 60 years ago, but ...
Sometimes a problem can be answered with a problem. It goes without saying that energy crisis and waste management rank high on the environmental challenges facing us today. When Japanese scientist Akinori Ito faced these two problems, he saw how the answer to one could be resolved by the problem of the other and vice versa. Thus, he invented a machine that takes untreated everyday plastics and converts them into oil that can easily be refined into diesel, kerosene and gasoline.
The below video illustrates further:
So, maybe we’ll have a use for all those plastic bags after all ...
